RU02 MONGOLS-TATAR_RUSSO

Mongol-Tatars:

Russian History: Mongol -- Tatars & Rus

by Michael Johnathan McDonald

Was the Golden Horde a 17th Century Invention? Yes, In Russian Chronicles Batu's Horde at Sarai never used the name. It possibly comes from Chinggis' description of his four sons as the Golden offspring later created in historiography in the 17th century. Also a possible reason for such a name came from Batu's living arrangements. He lived in a gold-top tent. Other possibilities included the cardinal color-points of the steppe system which had Yellow (like-gold) as its center color. Finally, other reasons cited were the color gold in Mongolian sources represented royalty. Ulus of Jochi was the name of the Horde at Sarai, Ulus meaning inheritance. There is confusion if Batu actually renamed his Horde to the Golden Horde. This may have been a reinvention in the 17th century. Ulus of Jochi is the name in the early sources, and some scholars referred to it as Kipchak Khanate. Batu’s Horde was originally charged with the eastern campaigns, and thus was called the Blue Horde which is accredited with the initial invasions of Russia, Poland and Hungary. The eastern Horde could not go east as the Pacific Ocean lay eastward. So they joined the White Horde, its direction west, and campaigned toward the west. However, the name of the Golden Horde to refer to the Horde that settled in Sarai has been widely used as a descriptive, after Batu split with his younger brother Shayban who took control of the regions in the Ural Mountains along the Ob and Irtysh Rivers, and thus will leave it so. Jochi, Chinggis' eldest son died and his patrimony was divided among his sons, Batu leader of the Blue Horde (Eastern), and Orda, leader of the White Horde (Western). Historians saw the word Golden and took to its description of the steppe color system for the cardinal directions : black — north, blue — east, red — south, white — west, and yellow (or gold) — center.

Was the name of the Horde that conquered Russia? The Blue Horde. The cardinal color-points of the steppe described the east, and it was Batu's destiny to conquer the east which was the north/west world with his brother Orda who commanded the west Horde. Most history books will often cite the wrong identity as the Golden Horde.

Is it true that Russia fought-off the Mongols so they couldn't go into Europe? Historical accounts for after the Mongol leader died, all the generals fled back to Karakorum for the election of the new Mongolian leader. The Mongols on the verge of taking Europe stopped and went east after hearing the news of the great Khan's death. However, more astutely, the Mongol forces could only battle on grassy plains and have an advantage on level ground. The steppe system ends at the Danube river in Europe. Mountainous regions and thick forest regions were not applicable for Mongol military tactics. They could fight, but they struggled in these conditions. This is one reason they never sacked Pskov, and Novgorod. The Mongol military strategies and tactics also explain the geography regions they dominated. Also, their armies needed large grassy plains to feed their horses, and forests did not provide a plausible setting for pastoralists.

What was the immediate impact on the Russians by the Mongol-Tatars? The depopulation of people on the boarder of the steppe-lands. A void of roughly one-hundred years until economic prosperity returned. The immediate impact on Russian cities were if a city didn’t pay tribute it would be sacked. Viceroys were placed by the Mongols into regions, especially large cites, to keep an eye on the newly subjugated people. A surveillance society resulted, and the people became slaves to the Mongol-Tatars, both economically and personally.

What was the intermediate impact?

Russians lost fertile lands to the south, and the Mongol-Tatars superimposed districts on Russian principalities. A redistributed head-count ultimately divided older cities into new sub-divided cities with different names. Vladimir replaced Kiev as dominant principality. Vladimir-Suzdal' split into Vladimir, Suzdal' and Rostov. Then further splitting of these cities made smaller sub-cites. The Khan of Sarai patronized both the Church ( there was a Christian monastery at Sarai that prayed for the Khan's success and wellbeing) and patronized the position of the grand prince. Byzantine was sympathetic to the Mongol-Tatars, after the Ottomans allowed the Byzantine Church to continue to have its metropolitan in Constantinople after its seizure in 1453.

Did the Mongols see Russia as their number one concern? No, the Russians were not economically as valuable as the international trade relations on the steppe and regions to the south. The Mongol-Tatars viewed the Russians as a secondary concern. 4,000-7,000 annual rubles were a pittance compared to the profits of international trade going on to the south of Sarai. However, this sum to the Russians was considered and almost overbearing at that time. About the decade of the 1380s, this annual tribute sum dwindled to about 1000 rubles; but the iralaki continued to collect the full some, thus becoming rich, promoting Moscow through artistic endeavors and political consolidation. Ultimately the Mongol-Tatars indirectly lead to the formation of Muscovy.

What were the early accounts of the Mongol devastation? Franciscan Missionary Carpini, sent by the Pope to Karakorum ( Mongol capital) declared to have been alerted to the presence of a baskaki in Russia in 1245. He passed through Russia on his way. He noted the absence of people and dead bodies strewn throughout the land.

Novgorodskaia pervaia letopis: The Novgorodian Chronicle: Golden Horde (or Kipchak Khanate), which ruled Russia for around 250 years account begins by noting that “ A group of pagans appeared… and no one knew who they were or where they came from, or what their language is, or what tribe they belong to, or what their religion is. Some say they are Tatars, and others call them Taurmeny, and other Pechenegs.” (29 halperin The Tatar Yoke).

The Mongol-Tatars subjugated the Russian cities and in what form was this? Impact on the Russian people were in the form of tribute, forced conscription, and slavery.

Mongols instituted a head-tax, which did not take into an account people that couldn't pay their share. They did this by a crude census (chislo) and installed a baskak in a given region. The newly divided districts were superimposed on the Russian principalities that re-numbered a head-figure of 10,000 people (t'my=census, t'ma=10,000 men) . baskaki stood as a watcher to alert the central Mongolian army if any uprising were brewing. The baskaki kept a small contingency with them at all times. A baskak can be viewed as a viceroy and a darugi can be viewed as a State Department desk officer. Darugi were absentee administrators, they took the place of the baskaki after the Sarai weakened. Posoly were envoys to Russian cites from the darugi. They came into Russian cities to bring the Khan's orders for conscription, tribute or any other conditions. The Baskaki ended when the plague hit, famine hit, Tamerlane re-routed the silk-route and fought various Golden Horde leaders causing a civil war witch fragmented the new and old Sarai capitals. When the darugi administrators were set up at Sarai, the only cultural contact the Russians had were the periodic Posoly going into Russian cites and the princes venturing to Sarai. The iarlyk took the place of the Baskaki in the 14^th century. This led to indirect tax collections and an absence of Mongols in Russian cities and an absence of Mongols in Russian cites and towns. Justifiably Posoly and darugi were cheaper to run, and this gave an advantage to the princes.

Tax free enclaves (slobody): Mongols left the Orthodox church in tact and later allowed them fiscal immunity. These policies were directly influenced by the Byzantine Church who supported Islam. This tax free enclaves included Russian artist schools and workshops, as well as monasteries, church lands and clergy. The theory to the Khans were the church had political sway against the princes, and they could keep them inline, and inform the Khan of any subversive action. In essence the Khan secretly played the Orthodox church against the grand princes. This was a method of a surveillance society. In return for the Orthodox tax exemption, the Byzantine church supported the Khans and Islam. They had a political identity in Sarai that contained Orthodox clergy that continually prayed for the Khan's success. In addition a Qu'ran was permanently placed in the Orthodox church in the Kremlin as a symbol of domination on the Islamic faith over the Orthodox faith.

What was the over all impact on the Culture of Russians (See my in-depth essay)?

Short answer: The Mongol-Tatar impact was relatively small. The Russians just barrowed what they could use and discarded the rest. A real tension of Islam and Orthodoxy made coexistence almost impossible. Both sides saw each other as infidels. The Mongol-Tatars and the Russian remained at a distance, in physicality and spirituality. Political expediency often can explain the intermarriage, social acquaintanceship, and symbols of sensitivity that only reflected the times and without permanence.

What were the gathering of lands program?

Ivan Kalita won the Grand Princedom from the Khan and he began to buy neighboring principalities and purchasing slaves back from the Khan to place them into the service for the Russian peoples. His nickname was ' money bags' because he had won the right to collect taxes for the Khan. Over time the tribute payments lessened, and the tax on the Russian people remained the same which meant that the winners of the tax collection pocked the difference. They used this extra money for purchasing power of lands and people. They also used it to promote themselves by building elaborate buildings as symbols of their legitimacy. This included inviting great artists, builders and engineers from the west. The Khan didn't mind this as long as he got his payments in full. Other aspects of the gathering of lands dealt with an issue of patrimony. Ivan III (1462-1505) claimed Novgorod was his domain, and he made war against them and brought them into the sphere of Muscovy. He also added the principalities of Tver' to his domains. Finally Moscow took control of all the north-eastern lands, but this can only be prefaced with the disintegration of the Khanate at Sarai which was weakened mainly after Tamerlane cut off their main financial control of the silk-route. The Horde could not threaten all the lands with subjugation any longer, and purchase a large military without the access to profits of the silk-route. However, a complexity continues, and the grand princes kept sending tribute, at a lesser amount mainly as a gesture. In return the Khan's supported the grand princes politically.

Initial incursion of the Mongols came in two periods and what were some of their military advantages?

Mongol houses can be set up in about one hour, and mobility was awesome. When a Mongol army is approaching, it puts up a lot of dust because each man takes 3-4 horses with them ( they eat horse) and the sight can look awesome from a distance. Fermented mare’s milk, is brought, so they can have it for a long time. A horse is not wasted on any parts. Dried cheeseballs, pack in their saddlebags, and take with them. Appanage the term when Kiev and Novgorod declines, and splintering of principalities, and ruling families drift apart each getting different lands, and trade-routs were drying up, no more Viking, and Rus’ and Byzantium was cut off by the steppe warriors. At its height, 1220s-1320s the Mongol-Tatars established a unity in the steppe, and the Rus; lands in the 1220s were conquered Rus’ but the Mongol -Tatars left to attend a succession dispute in 1241, when the Great Khan Ogedei died in Mongolia, and Batu turned back from his siege of Vienna to take part in disputing the succession. The Mongol-Tatars returned in 1230s-1240s to Rus’ to subjugate it. They did not return to Europe as was cited above because of the logistics, and not because the Europeans or Russians had fought them off.

What does it mean to say a Mongol-Tatar Yoke?

The Tatar or Mongol Yoke was aptly named because it implied a Marxist interpretation of economic development, emphasizing the tensions between different groups. Especially pastoral and nomadic, and urban and agricultural life of Russians.

Ivan IV, Some historians claim he looked to Chinggisid rulers to fashion a state?

Ivan secularized the church by appointing his own people to support him and if a clergy person didn't support him he removed them by various measures. In reference he became the church and state. Historians claimed that by adopting the title of tsar Ivan was attempting to legitimize his rule by the inheritance of the Chinggisid rulers, and not a continuity of Rome, Byzantine and Kiev rulership. Far from this view, Ivan and the advisors had to put a stop to the constant threats from without their boarders. In order to accomplish this feat, the Russian people were influenced by a national doctrine. This doctrine mainly came from Metropolitan Makarii who promoted nationalistic thoughts on Orthodoxy. He accomplished this by collecting all the nationalist works and promoting the continuity of Orthodox religion and to the disfavor of Islam and nomadic rule. This, of course, did not create the only nationalist thought of the Russian people. The Mongol-Tatars still contained a sense of threatening posture on the boarders of Russia. They came in a sacked Moscow in May 1571 and took 100,000 Russian back with them to the steppe as slaves. This figure paled in comparison to the conservative number of pointless destruction of life in the Oprichnina period. The commoners felt the brunt of injustice and understood that imperial measures determined the necessity to survive. The centralizing of Russia at Moscow came from the continued threats of slavery and pillaging by the Islamic and Mongol forces out on the steppe and to the east in the Ural mountains. A Siberian Khanate also existed further east. Raizan, Astrakhan and Sarai were close enough that if the Mongol-Tatars wanted to sack a village they could arrive at any Russian city quickly. The Russians had to conquer these Khanates to give them peace of mind. Many historians have called this imperialism, the first imperialism of Russia. However, a more measured treatment allows a clearer picture on this topic. I contend that is was not Ivan IV's intuitive to oversee the conquests of Kazan, Astrakhan and Siberia but a consensus of the ruling elite. Historiography plays heavily into the mode of fashioning Ivan IV as a great centralizing leader in the nineteenth century. One only needs to hearken back to the question of why did Ivan split the country into two realms? This understanding of Ivan's motives directly opposes a centralizing theme marked by the propaganda machine of the Soviet era. Joseph Stalin had communized artistic works.

THE EMERGENCE

OF MUSCOVY AND THE MONGOL "YOKE"

I. Demonization of Mongols, the "Mongol yoke"

II. The first vacuum of power: early 1200s, the Mongol invasion

economic devastation and recovery

invasion and exploitation: l3th century direct fiscal administration and military recruiting (baskak)

l4th century: intermediary Rus' princes -- those who won the "iarlyk," or Khan's charter to collect and deliver taxes

III. The second vacuum of power: 1360s+

Novgorod and Pskov

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Ukraine, Belarus' 1260s+

Northeast Rus' = "Grand Principality of Vladimir" = Vladimir-Suzdalia

1300s: Struggle for grand-princely title: Moscow vs. Tver', Suzdal', Riazan'

IV. Moscow's rise: V. O. Kliuchevskii's "litany"

geography

primogeniture and dynastic war (1433-56)

the iarlyk: tax collecting for the Khan

metropolitan's favor

territorial expansion to North and Baltic (not Kiev)

V. Cultural influence: patterns and structural barriers

Steppe nomads vs. forest dwelling farmers

Turkic speakers vs. Slavic speakers

Islamic high culture in Arabic or Persian vs. Orthodox Christian culture in Old Church Slavonic

VI. Mongol influence:

Devastation and resource depletion

Cultural isolation from the West and Byzantium?

Barbarity in law codes and social mores? Autocracy?

Military, trade and administration

VI. The utility of the "yoke" for argument for Kiev-Moscow continuity

Tatar/Turkic words entering Russian

terms of military, trade, administration (Tatar words taken into Russian)

den'ga -- a monetary unit; later den'gi = money

altyn -- a coin = 6 den'gi

tamga -- brand, seal, stamp

surguch -- sealing wax

kniga -- book

iarlyk -- charter of privileges or immunities

tolmach -- interpreter, translator

karandash -- pencil

bumaga -- paper

zhikovina -- signet ring

defter' -- license, document authorizing tax collection

kazna -- treasury

kaznachei -- treasurer

kagan -- khan, king

kaganets -- oil lamp

bakcha -- kitchen garden

bakshish -- tip, bribe

stakan -- drinking glass; from Persian through Turkic

lavka -- a bench or shelf; a shop, a small store

korchma -- tavern, inn

tovar -- commercial goods

klobuk -- headgear, cowl

lal -- ruby

biriuza -- turquoise

almaz -- diamond

zhemchug -- mother of pearl

tafta -- taffeta

kamka -- damask

barkhat -- velvet

voilok -- felt

tvarog -- cottage cheese; fermented cheese

psheno -- millet, wheat

pirog -- pie

kover -- carpet

also -- numerous terms for horses, horse breeding, colors of horses, types of horses, equestrian skills, etc. -- e.g.:

loshad' -- horse

kobyla -- brood mare

kobylka -- filly

khomut -- horse collar

telega -- cart

kolymaga -- 2-wheeled cart

bugai -- bull, ox

other misc. words:

ukha -- fish soup

barsukov -- badger

kuga -- bulrush

kovyl' -- feather grass (one of the steppe grasses)

moroz -- frost, freezing

pugat' -- to frighten, scare

Things to know

“the Russian sources describe the Tatars’ Intention for two and a half centuries as pleniti in Russia, the verb implies not endlessly repeated conquest, but plundering. (Halperin MY 169).

Historian Sergei M. Soloviev described the Russian defeat of the Tatars at the Battle of Kulikovo as one of the greatest victories of “ Europe over Asia.” (Halperin TTY 94)

By the 14^th Century succession struggles and infighting fractured the Golden Horde.
Uzbeg Khan (1312-41)
Timur was really more Turkish than Mongol, in his language and religion.
Timer 1382, allied initially with Tokhtamysh, who later became his foe, focusing on Timer’s forces in Azerbaijan in 1385.

Mongolian things:

Pony-size horses, the blood sweating horses, the grassy steppe,

Naturally a horse culture of the steppe, where boys grow-up on the horseback, and the product of sale is horses, which are also a source of food.

1240 Swedes defeated then in 1242 Teutonic Knights threaten Russia, and Alexander and Novgorod, and Alexander other principalities are paying tribute so that they will not get conquered. Russians vast lands are coveted by the Germans and the Mongols.

Battle of the Neve River, the Teutonic Knights, there we fought a vast army, cruel adversary the Swedish host, we broke their ship into matchsticks, and for the sake of our Motherland. (Russian movie 1938, a year later the movie taken off the showing because of the signing of a Russian/Nazi pact and this movie makes the Germans look bad, throwing babies into the rivers).

Alexander at Novgorod, had a hard time to getting the Free Novgorodians to fight in a war, pacifists. So impassioned speeches. “ For the great people.”

“ we have a saying, it is better to die than to leave your country”

Two different worlds meeting Alexander and the Tatars, and he refuses to become a general in their Golden Horde.

Lecture section:

Mongolians,

2000 years, literally the nomadic culture of the steppe rout, and span from China to Europe. Silk and Spice rout involved on the steppe rout.

Spears of the Russians using them on horseback, and

The general empire, the whole rout capture, and Mongols get a adjective to describe Turkish, and Tatars, and a whole list of tribes, and peoples, and Turkish word was Tatar, so it was an interchangeable reference that Chinngis Khan established. Last about 250 years refered too as the Mongol ‘Yoke’ The Scythians also becomes a generic word for the various steppe cultures and warriors of the steppe. The Russian consciousness about this period is sever in many historians, because they were slaves, captured, and the subjugation, etc… These Soviet books also created historiography. Children lead-off to captivity, land the property of foreigners, by bearing the weight of full Tatar , saved Europe form the scourge, so it was this reason, the tale says, that Russia remained 200 years behind Europe. This was historiaograghy. The Scythians in the 20^th century then got a positive look in history, and westerners got a negative pussy perception.

So anathema, so Tatars is to blame for cutting off Democracies of the west, so what we have in this mythology, Mongols are the blow that cuts-off the Russian that caused the Russia to the backwardness for over 250 years.

1227 Chinngis Khan died, from Germany To China, to India to China, then Ugaday, Chinngis’ third son, then Kublai Khan served as the third great leader. Headquarters was established at Surai, next to the Volga, right in Russian lands. Mongols were the last of the great dynasty of the steppe, it was widely successful. The Mongols were their for a reason, a profit was to be had, and the vacuum of power before the Mongols, in Kiev and Novgorod, and so when the Mongols came it was easy for them to conquer the Rus’ people.

Today, a Afghanistan horse tournament, even today, has no rules, and it is rough, the game is timeless, and even some American troops have tried to take part in the game. It is a no-rules game, emphasis added.

Stirrups and the High-Saddle allowed them to get up and swivel with their multi-boned bows, with could pierce armor which is why they were so dangerous. Traveled with gigantic caravan of supplies.

Houses can be set up in about one hour, and mobility was awesome in this day. When a Mongol army is approaching, puts up a lot of dust because each man takes 3-4 horses with them, they eat horse but the sight can look awesome from a distance. Fermented mare’s milk, is brought, so they can have it for a long time. A horse is not wasted on any parts. Dried cheeseballs, pack in their saddlebags, and take with them. Appanage the term when Kiev and Novgorod declines, and splintering of principalities, and ruling families drift apart each getting different lands, and trade-routs were drying up, no more Viking, and Rus’ and Bysantium was cut off by the steppe warriors. At its height, 1220s-1320s it established a unity in the steppe, and the Rus; lands in the 1220s conquered Rus’ but left to Chinngis death, and returned in 1230s-1240s to Rus’.

1294: From Ukraine to China empire, and subdivides with sons and borthers with the great Khan ( Chinngis) and subdivide into near Russia the Golden Horde, so we have subdivided. The Pax Mongolia ( Tataria some places) was now in this period.

15ht century is the rise of Muscovy because it was protected from the forest, and people had moved north. So Pax Mongolia (Tartica) was keeping the trade rolling, historians says; so in the initial attack cities and town destroyed, but after pay tribute then let people live. Severe economic stress after the attacks in about 50 years later, do Suzdalia and Novgorod get enough funds to pay form stone structures.

Novgorod trade had changed from far-trade to local trade, and the Mongols didn’t want to kill everyone because they wanted to exact tribute from living people, so historians are mixed. To be accurate, there was to be a negative respect, humiliating tribute, personal visits by the grand price , a humiliating factor, the collection of funds to pay the bastards. 13^th century, the Muslim head-tax, is installed. Local populations had to also provide services, feed and house the enemies, keep the roads the waste and horses, and later on in history, the people’s of the steppe do not want to be in the forest, so they get Russian Princes to collect the taxes, the princes skim off the top and gather wealth, so they have power later on.

1) So first, direct and direct collection of taxes

2) Later they rule by threat of attack and collection by Rus’ people.

No grave site was ever found in the Russian forest, so the Mongols didn’t like the forest, so the Russian move up to Moscow and wagged their tongues at them, and later schemed.

Princes squabbles, subdividing from collateral succession, and everyone didn’t get along, and it comes increasingly an agrarians economy, where as Kiev and Novgorod had a increasing hunting and gathering culture, but now a settling and sedentary mentality and more urban society, people settle so this laster 1360s, a new vacuum resulted, the Mongoloid Empire was severely splintereing because of dynastic conflicts there, so the subdivisions were great. So the Mongolians weaken and buy the mid 1400s, the splintering off turns to autonomous splinter states, and the

1360, we have princes, skipping taxes, taking risks and it was a post-Mongoloid of power.

3 emerging powers: Novgorod, Poland Lithuania, and Northeast Rus’ had been called a Mesopotamia for all the rivers, and two major waterfares, were great portages to the Baltic and

Various princes especially Moscow and Kiev vow to call the grand prince of Lagima, so travel to Tatar capital and vie to be the king, hostage at Surai for - brother, and at the same time Moscow, doing everything to become a state. Why did Moscow win out the succeeded over rival, first, Moscow is advantageous geography, the various river routs, and in a 50 mile river you can go all directions, a central point to river connections to all of the directions of the world. Soon Moscow controlled the river trade routs which eventually meant big-money and this meant expansion, and to capture the heads at these rivers, all the towns on the banks of these rivers the Muscovites considered this as the plan to consolidate power over all of Russia. So water was the key.

Kiev and Rus’ was gone, and since the Mongol Tatars. So Rus’ gone. To Moscow rose as the new spirit of the Russian people, and this was a major factor, and most notably was a string of luck the royal hours began to practice primogeniture and this was key for the powerbase. As lateral base succession is an actual weakening of power, but Primogeniture is also dangerous, but usually builds a strong center base. So notice that circles of power meant people were blinded not killed, because it will start a blood feud, and that was a bid deal. The boyars are practicing the lateral success meaning their possession become more fragmented.

Third factor, the rise of Muscovite princes was the won the support of the Golden Horde, that is to collected taxes and they pocked a good amount, they were the authorize tax collector of Surai.

4 MAJOR POINT TO KNOW RISE OF MOSCOW

Recap: factors: Water, Succession, Rise of tax collectors of GH, and finally Metropolitan Peter happens 1325 visiting Moscow, he died, and the Moscow persuades the next in line to move the see to Moscow, and the guy that dies was just visiting. So ecclesiastical legitimacy was passed to Moscow. Now the central authority of the Slavs. A cult of St. Peter builds up as the visitor, and his is the important persona a cult of personality. So it becomes dominant by these things so they became

1480 standing off the Golden Horse actually see collapsing, and they Moscow, tax collectors said I do not want to pay taxes, in reality thGH was already in deep decline.

Emblematic of wars were Tatars on both sides and Russians – so not as neat.

What was the Mongol yoke, that history is written by white man in their forties, so the Mongol experience did not mean fundamental changes in Russian culture, there was not much contract and when there was we see a cultural borrowing.

Russians were people who trapped and hunted, the Nomads were herders and travelers.

Turkish language, used by the Mongols, Russian on the Russian sides. SO THEY COULD NOT CONVERSE

They couldn’t intermarry because the Mongol became Islamic, the Tatars, and the culture interchange was limited. SO the level of culture, Persian in literacy in Culture, the arts of Persona and Islamic religious development, but the Russians were illiterate mostly, and art of Greek.

Mongols took to Aristotle, but didn’t happen in Muscovy, and if it is often said, corporal punishment in Muscovy law codes, but in reality were less harsh that their predecessors, and only in the 17^th century that they get harder. Also, the barbarian’s views.

The Mongols didn’t leave political theory, the an election in Mongolia town clan elections. Muscovy more autocracy than Mongoloid power so no influence.

What are the culture impact of the Mongols, Practical skills in military organization and government administration and bureaucracy ( not kingship). Look at the handout list, coming from Mongol.

Only barrow what they see can make them better in all aspects of life.

When did Russian History Began, what is the continuity debate really about?

How did Moscow Rise to Power?

The first vacuum of power: early 1200s, the Mongol invasion can be said to be a piece of the puzzle, but we must be careful not to conclude that the Mongols have brought an end to the Kievan Rus’. Economic devastation were created problems from the west, where traditional trade routs were exchanged with new and growing western powers that severely hampered the economics of the trade towns such as Novgorod and Pskov. The decline of Kiev had taken place before the Mongols arrived. The city had not enough resources due to previous economic devastation to field an army to ward off the powerful steppe incursions to the west. Kiev close to the boarder of the steppe began a shift in migration toward the northern forest-zones, as the steppe nomads made their homes and bases along the grassy planes.

Moscow arose from four basic principles: geography, political (includes military), luck and ecclesiastical. First, geography, the causeways became a set of ideals to establish satellite towns. Moscow is centered on rivers that spread out in all directions. Controlling these river towns and cities created dominance in trade privileges. Second, Muscovy was protected from the forest, and people had moved north, where the steppe nomads preferred not to travel or inhabit.

Ecclesiastical:

Ecclesiastical dominion produces an added principle for power in Muscovy legitimacy. Vladimir had procured Keivan legitimacy by moving the see to Kiev (PLACE DATE), and building churches, which helped legitimize Orthodox Christianity for all of Rus’. Ecclesiastical expansion and church construction became a continuing policy of legitimacy later for all Kievan Rus’. In similar fashion, but without continuity to Rus’ history, the metropolitan was moved from Kiev to Vladimir and then to Moscow. This came about in Northeast Rus' as one aspect of the second vacuum of power in 1300s which saw a struggle for grand-princely title. The Grand Principality of Vladimir consisted of Vladimir-Suzdalia and saw a struggle between two powerful princes and succession privileges controlled by the head of the Golden Horde.

Mikhail Yaroslavich, second son of Yaroslav III, fashioned himself as the first Grand Prince of of all Rus’. Subsequently, Uzbeg Khan had given Yuri Danilovich, Prince of Moscow, the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir. Mikhail Yaroslavich, also held the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir and Tver. Both men wanted to legitimize their rule the way Vladimir had in Kiev in the 10^th Century by promoting their own metropolitan. Mikhail promoted his own metropolitan and Peter (d. December 20, 1326) was promoted by ( Other person). Consequently, Mikhail battled Yuri at Bortenevo on December 22, 1317 and defeated him in which upset Uzbeg who summoned Mikhail and had him killed at Sarai. With the fall of the competition, ecclesiastical legitimacy was passed-on to Moscow and now the central authority of the Slavs. Peter became the first metropolitan to reside in Moscow. In continuing fashion, “the Cathedral of the Dormition and several other stone churches were built by Ivan Kalita, Yury's successor, in the Moscow Kremlin” to symbolize this new Muscovite ecclesiastical dominion, just as Vladimir had once envisioned legitimacy by use of the ecclesiastical symbolism. (wiki). Ecclesiastical dominion was one principle in Muscovy’s rise to power. (THAT IS THE TIE BACK)

As regards Russian politics, Öz-Beg supported the earliest princes of Muscovy - his brother-in-law Yury of Moscow and Yury's successor Ivan Kalita - against the westward-leaning Princes of Tver. Three of these - Mikhail of Tver, his son Alexander and grandson Theodor - were killed in Sarai at Öz-Beg's behest. Tver's uprising against the Horde was bloodily suppressed by Muscovite and Tatar forces in 1327.

Ivan I Danilovich Kalita (Ива́н I Дани́лович Калита́ in Russian) (1288 – March 31, 1340, Moscow), Prince of Moscow (from 1325), Grand Prince of Vladimir (from 1328), son of Daniil Aleksandrovich (Prince of Moscow).

After the defection of Tver to Lithuania, khan Muhammad Ozbeg of the Golden Horde was forced to rely on Ivan as his preeminent Russian vassal. Ivan was the Mongols' leading tax collector and made himself and Moscow very wealthy by maintaining his loyalty to the Horde (hence, the nickname Kalita, or moneybag). He used this wealth to give loans to neighbouring Russian principalities. These cities gradually fell deeper and deeper into debt, a condition that would allow Ivan's successors to annex them. Ivan's greatest success, however, was convincing the Khan in Saray that his son should succeed him as Grand Prince of Vladimir, from then on the important position almost always belonged to the ruling house of Moscow.

Political: Taxes” Luck/taxes: Mongols lose power, infighting, and tax collection.

The Golden Horde in13th century ran direct fiscal administration by sending in their own people to cities to collect taxes. Geography of Northern Rus’ played some role in changing fiscal administration. The forest-zone of the north did not fit the lifestyle of the steppe nomadic people. To offset this preference, some of the intermediary Rus' princes won the right to the iarlyk in the 14^th century. This led to indirect tax collections. The Mongols continued to control by a threat-policy of war. In addition, this could be seen as a result of the second vacuum in the 1360s; the Mongoloid Empire was severely splintering because of dynastic conflicts which made it harder for them to regulate their fiscal authority. These indirect polices allowed the iarlyk to skim-off, not report, and sometimes steal revenue. Without direct Mongol oversight the iarlyk did not report the exact amount to them, thus they were able to keep some of the money for themselves. The result was a rise in princely wealth.

While Peter was visiting Moscow he died, and this was seen as luck as his successor was asked to stay in Mocow, and move the Holy See to there.

This can be seen as luck when the Golden Horde broke up into four major groups, and division created a certain freedom in the North in which Muscovy took advantage. In the 1360s, a new vacuum resulted; the Mongoloid Empire was severely splintering because of dynastic conflicts. By the mid-14^th century autonomous splinter states can be seen as a result of luck or more autonomous power in the north.

Kiev and Novgorod declines, and splintering of principalities, and ruling families drift apart each getting different lands, and trade-routs were drying up, no more Viking, and Rus’ and Byzantium was cut off by the steppe warriors.

Peter's alliance with Moscow helped assert his own authority and contributed to the rise of the House of Moscow. (Wiki)

In order to procure legitimacy, Peter was promoted as a Metropolitan of Moscow (?By Yuri) Vladimir had procured Keivan legitimacy by moving the see to Kiev, building churches, and establishing Orthodox Christianity for all of Rus’. In similar fashion, but without continuity, the metropolitan was moved from Kiev to Vladimir and then to Moscow.

Saint Peter, Metropolitan of Moscow and all Russia (Пётр in Russian) (? — December 20, 1326) was the Russian metropolitan who moved his see from from Kiev to Vladimir and then to Moscow. Later he was proclaimed a patron saint of Moscow. (wiki)

the Cathedral of the Dormition and several other stone churches were built by Ivan Kalita in the Moscow Kremlin.

…..ecclesiastical legitimacy was passed to Moscow. Now the central authority of the Slavs.

(wiki)

Mikhail Yaroslavich (Russian: Михаил Ярославич) (1271 – November 22, 1318), also known as Michael of Tver, was a Prince of Tver (from 1285) who ruled as Grand Prince of Vladimir from 1304 until 1318.

Mikhail Yaroslavich, Grand Prince of Vladimir and Tver, wanted to advance his own candidate for this position. Peter's nomination caused prolonged animosity between Mikhail and Peter to the point that the latter had to ask for protection from the Muscovite princes.

Mikhail Yaroslavich was the second son of Yaroslav III and succeeded him in 1285. As a result of a long struggle, he became the Grand Prince of Vladimir in 1305 and the first among Russian rulers started to style himself Grand Prince of All Rus.

In 1317, Uzbeg Khan of the Golden Horde gave the title of the Grand Prince of Vladimir to Yuri Danilovich, Prince of Moscow, and sent his army to help Yuri in his struggle with Mikhail Yaroslavich. On December 22, 1317 Mikhail defeated Yuri at a village called Bortenevo (40 km from Tver). Later on, Mikhail was summoned by the Khan and had to go to the Horde to "explain" himself. He was eventually killed in the Horde by Yuri's servants. Later, the Russian Orthodox Church declared Mikhail the holy patron of Tver. (/wiki)

IDEOLOGY AND AUTOCRACY IN MUSCOVY
I. Amber Room, Catherine Palace, Tsarskoe Selo (Pushkin), outside St. Petersburg

II. Finish discussion of Mongol “yoke”

III. Adopting an image in Ivan III’s time

“White Emperor” (albus imperator)
Orthodox “translatio imperii” model
“Zadonshchina” -- tale of victory by Or. Pr. Dmitrii Donskoi over Mamai and Golden Horde in 1380 at Kulikovo Field
Kremlin churches:
Annunciation Cathedral (palace church, gr. pr. baptized and married here)
Dormition Cathedral (Uspenskii sobor); Tsarskoe mesto (Monomakh Throne), mid- 16th c. (Vladimir Monomakh, 12th-c. Kievan gr. pr.)
chronicle writing: Nikon Chronicle (1520s), Book of Degrees (1560s)
“Tale of Princes of Vladimir”
The Cap (shapka; crown) of Monomakh

IV. Claims about the power of the tsar: two interdependent strains

the most powerful tsar: Agapetus
the most pious and most comradely tsar: Agapetus
grand prince rules TOGETHER WITH HIS BOYARS
Herberstein: 16th-c. visitor
Olearius: 17th-c. visitor

V. Integrating the empire through symbol, ritual and ceremony

coronation ceremonies
Cap (Crown) of Kazan’, l550s
Palm Sunday Procession
architecture and icons as visible claims of integration: Kremlin as center of empire Archangel Michael Cathedral: necropolis of Moscow dynasty
Dormition Cathedral: necropolis of metropolitans/patriarchs of the Church spread of Muscovite architecture to provinces: Kazan’, Pereslalv’-Zalesskii
cults of saints: the three “Moscow miracle-workers” -- Metropolitans Peter, Aleksii, and Iona
cults of regional saints and regional icons
attempt to link Muscovy with Kievan Rus’
using ritual to establish a “symbolic center” and to demonstrate tsar’s power AND piety ritual as catharsis and community building
grand prince rules together with his boyars
Coronation of Michael Romanov, 1613

Moscow the “Third Rome,” or “New Jerusalem”
Muscovite expansion:
1478 Novgorod, 1510 Pskov, 1514 Smolensk
1551 Kazan’, 1556 Astrakhan and Volga River route
Key rulers:
Ivan III (1462-1505)
his son, Vasilii III (1 505-33)
his son and grandson of Ivan III, Ivan IV (1533-84)

THE EMERGENCE OF MUSCOVY AND THE MONGOL “YOKE”

I. Demonization of Mongols, the “Mongol yoke”

II. The first vacuum of power: early 1200s, the Mongol invasion
economic devastation and recovery
invasion and exploitation: 13th century direct fiscal administration and military recruiting (baskak)

14th century: intermediary Rus’ princes -- those who won the “iarlyk.” or Khan’s charter to collect and deliver taxes
III. The second vacuum of power: 1360s+
Novgorod and Pskov
The Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Ukraine, Belarus’ 1 260s+
Northeast Rus’ = “Grand Principality of Vladimir” = Vladimir-Suzdalia
1 300s: Struggle for grand-princely title: Moscow vs. Tver’, Suzdal’, Riazan’

IV. Moscow’s rise: V. 0. KIiuchevskii’s “litany”
geography
primogeniture and dynastic war (1433-565
the iarlyk: tax collecting, for the Khan
metropolitan’s favor
territorial expansion to North and Baltic (not Kiev)
V. Cultural influence: patterns and structural barriers
Steppe nomads vs. forest dwelling farmers
Turkic speakers vs. Slavic speakers
Islamic high culture in Arabic or Persian vs. Orthodox Christian culture in Old Church Slavonic
VI. Mongol influence:
Devastation and resource depletion
Cultural isolation from the West and Byzantium?
Barbarity in law codes and social mores? Autocracy?
Military, trade and administration
VI. The utility of the “yoke” for argument for Kiev-Moscow continuity

Both Sophias in Nov. and Keiv are dedicated to Yaroslav.

Italian style in St. Petersburg,

Amber panels were a gift from Russia from the Prussia Emperor.

Moscow, and Amber thin slivers, arranged in a mosaic,

One British visitor thought one of the gaudiest things in bad taste.

Russia had its own Native People

By Aksherkan, and below Sarai, is the try steppe, and dramatically didn’t environment than the slavs who lived in the north. On the Volga, American Indians run through the forest, on foot, like the Last Mohican reference, without making any noise runs through the forest, but the steppe warriors were not forest dwellers, and could not being horse culture, was helpless in the forest against the Muscovites. So compare the forest zone with the dry steppe, so horses not so quite useful thorough the forest. In Novgorod, a wet boggy season in the spring is not the environment that steppe nomads wanted to live or inhabit.

Lagimar- Suzdala principality, so each principality is ruled by a prince, form Rurik heritage, and Mongols live on steppe. What was it like living under Mongol power, so there is a logical assumption there had to be a lot of contact, they come over the mountains, and each year collect taxes; but cultures have their own set of ideals and only barrow what is useful. So when we examine the Scandinavian Vikings, there were relatively few in number and they melded into Slavs; they also conquered Sicily, and they were adsorbed in to the culture, but the Tatars were not a small group of peoples, they were a massive group of peoples.

Surely it was not benign relationship. But I do not think it is appropriate to blame the ills of Russia on Mongols ‘ yoke’ period, and Russian historiography has invented that the Mongols are to blame for all the RUussian’s current and historic problems.

So why was Kiev and Rus’ so important? Seminal movement politically and ecclesiastical, - Rurik, and Vladimir Christianity, but Kiev falls victim to the Mongols, but cultural heritage begins where one chose, and there was a cultural legacy, but not a culture a cultural continuity, and Kiev and Rus’ declined, and when Moscow rose, we can start Russian history here – there was no continuity. The argument was Kiev, trade to east, political contact with western Europe, Kiev direct infusions of Greek high culture, Kiev was politically more pluralistic, more lively and among the princes, the Rurik veche, had cooperation, but in Moscow emphasis on a single autocratic ruler, a nature on this concept. Muscovy is more agrarian and depended less on trade, then Kive and Rus’, no veche in Moscow, so how can one show continuity, so if one blames the Mongols you can finesse this contradiction. Continuity exist if you blame the

Greeks called foreigners barbarians because they couldn’t understand their speaking and it sounded like bar, bar, bar, bar…. But this happen in Classical Greek, even when refereeing to the Macedonians. So barbarian practices were not a creating of the Tatars, but already in culture.

So if there is discontinuity you cannot blame it on the Mongols, Different periods, direrento locations and different experiences, so Keiv Rus never can be assumed as the precursors for Muscovite politics and culture.

Tatar words into Russian language, is mainly trade products, and not political or culture.

Viking was Slavic trade languages, and very few came form Scandinavians.

Viking legacy to Keiv and Rus’ was the idea of the Prince, but the Prince was not a Viking idea.

Muscovy

When did Russian History Began, what is the continuity debate really about?

Ivan Kalita (r. 1328-41) won the right to the iarlyk.
Ivan II, the Meek (r. 1353-59)
Dmitrii Donskoi (r. 1359-89)
Basil I (1389-1425)
Basil II, the blind (1425-62)
Ivan III, the Great m. Zoe Paleologue ( patrimony, coercive, state building ( takes Novgorod)
Basil III (Vasilli) m. Helen Glinskaia, Regent 1533-38
Ivan IV, the Terrible m. Anastasia Romanova (coercive, state building ( takes Mongol Lands)

1474 Ivan sent for specialists from Venice, repeatedly asks for volunteers and Italian architects, mathematicians and artists to help create Moscow as the cultural center of Russia. Prominent builder Marco Ruffo, Pietro Solario, Alevisio, and Fieravanti. Fieravanti built (lived in Russia 1475-1479) Cathedral of Assumption.
Cathedrals of Annunciation, the Assumption, and the Archangel Michael became the centerpieces of the Kremlin. Coronations, weddings, and tombs of the rulers of Russia
Appanage period education was in an eclipse.
Grand. Duke Ivan Danilovich of Moscow (1301-1341), called Kalita ("Moneybag"), was the actual founder of the Muscovite state. He spread his reign over a considerable part of the land between the Oka and Volga rivers. Rostov was an important city of the Volga
1354 Moscow becomes the seat of the metropolitan. Peter dies on a visit to Moscow, and this is luck, as his successor is asked to stay the see.
Appanage landlord acted as rulers. So how to have a state when everyone is the boss? Apaanage is connected to commerce of the tilling of the soil, international trade during this period is hard to reconcile.
Sergius starts out as monk in forest, then becomes recognized spiritual leader. Blessing added strength to Dimitrii. St. Sergius inspired Russian people and introduce a more disciplined and strictly enforced communal life in the monastery (281).
The building of the Kremlin, incorporation of local saints of the various traditional cities into the Muscovy pantheon.
The façade of autocracy,
Church council and new legal codes the Subenik of 1550(134 HOR)
1556, the establishment of general regulations and military service. People either joined the army or were there jobs were considered to support it through various programs including taxes.
The tightening of the Church’s power of land ownership.
1550, Ivan IV engaged in army reform, such as developments of a southern defense line, The creation of new military squads, such as the streltsy, the incorporation of Mongolian military tactics. 1550 a new struggle against people of the step. Ivan incorporated commoners into his army and personal or court official he met on campaigns, such as Alexis Adashev.
Appendage period under Ivan was ended.
Ivan crowned tsar, now in ideology a titular leader of foreign affairs and Muscovy government. However, the boyars still ruled along with Ivan.

How did Moscow Rise to Power?

The first vacuum of power: early 1200s, the Mongol invasion can be said to be a piece of the puzzle, but we must be careful not to conclude that the Mongols have brought an end to the Kievan Rus’.

Economic devastation were created problems from the west, where traditional trade routs were exchanged with new and growing western powers that severely hampered the economics of the trade towns such as Novgorod and Pskov. The decline of Kiev had taken place before the Mongols arrived. The city had not enough resources due to previous economic devastation to field an army to ward off the powerful steppe incursions to the west. Kiev close to the boarder of the steppe began a shift in migration toward the northern forest-zones, as the steppe nomads made their homes and bases along the grassy planes.

Moscow arose from four basic principles: geography, political (includes military), luck and ecclesiastical ( include church building, incorporating each cities aesthetics, saints localized, see in Moscow).

First, geography, the causeways became a set of ideals to establish satellite towns. Moscow is centered on rivers that spread out in all directions. Controlling these river towns and cities created dominance in trade privileges. Second, Muscovy was protected from the forest, and people had moved north, where the steppe nomads preferred not to travel or inhabit.

Ecclesiastical:

Political: Taxes” Luck/taxes: Mongols lose power, infighting, and tax collection.

Peter's alliance with Moscow helped assert his own authority and contributed to the rise of the House of Moscow. (Wiki)

the Cathedral of the Dormition and several other stone churches were built by Ivan Kalita in the Moscow Kremlin.

ecclesiastical legitimacy was passed to Moscow. Now the central authority of the Slavs.

The Mongol-Tatar issue on Russia involves a set of extremely complex issues that have been over looked by most historians addressing the Mongol-Tatar impact on Russian history. When the Mongol-Tatar Khan Uzbeg officially adopted Islam as the law of the Golden Horde, he accomplished an incorporation of elaborate set of institutions that were never a part of the Mongol’s culture.

Understanding the impact on the Russians from the Mongol-Tatar period must be defined in the context of its complexities. The initial impact on Russia from the Blue Horde’s incursions and destruction is not the same impact as the Golden Horde period of Mongol rule in Sarai, and increasing, not the same impact as the Mongol-Tatar period where they had adopted Islam in the 14^th century, been fractured, and assimilated into the native cultures around them.

The native cultural impact on the Russians from the Blue Horde was absent, because their job was to subjugate their charged territories. The later Golden Horde, who settled in Sarai, can only be viewed in a strictly Mongol sense of any transference of ideas on military, culture, politics or economics. Uzbeg Khan (1312-41) political decision to adopt Islam in the 14^th century can only be viewed from the impact of the severity in which the Mongol-Tatars incorporated Islamic institutions. From this period onward, it ceased to be a Mongol-Tatar cultural perspective and became an Islamic cultural conglomerate.

The Russian Chronicles should be used with caution since bookman took to revision periodically and concentrated on Russo-Mongol-Tatar relations after conquerors had adopted Islam. They do not delve into the suzerainty of the Mongols but treat Russo-Mongol-Tatar relations by a perspective of Christianity verses Islam. The failure to demarcate the divide between a strictly Mongol period and the Islamic – Mongol period often hampers historian’s observations.

Understanding the Mongols pre-Islamic period provides their impact on Russia. For this we turn to the Mongol’s ideas on culture, politics or economics before they made their entrance onto the world stage.

The Mongols were a nomadic people who lived north of China. They were expert hunters who develop a special type of bow that gave them extra shooting power. This, a bone-bow, displayed extra strength with an extension on the ends for extra power which were no match for people on the ground. The power of the bow could deliver an arrow with enough force to pierce metal.

The Mongols took trips to the Tarim Basin to gather ‘blood-sweating horses.’ These were small, swift horses, that bled while sweating from mosquitoes bites. They developed a wooden raised saddle in which to pivot on and stirrups to balance all a Mongol invention. This allowed them to shoot with their bone-bows forward and backward with deadly accuracy.

The Mongol military strategies of deception of drawing out armies into an ambush created a legendary successful fighting tactic that lasted until their enemies began to understand it and incorporate it. Together with speed and power and military strategies, the Mongols were no match to any armies they encountered. The only drawback was they could not fight well in the forest. This is one of the reasons they dominated the steppe system that spread form the Pacific Ocean in the east to the Danube River in the west.

The steppe system is grassy planes that run east to west diagonally across earth. The intersections are rivers that run north and south along the steppe horizontally. Traditionally the silk route which runs through the steppe was recorded in ancient times. Various nomadic tribes controlled trade-routes whenever an empire was absent in history in the regions close to the steppe. Eastern and western trade dominated the concept of the silk route. It was this concept that the Mongols began to consider apprehending, controlling and ultimately dominating before they set out toward the west.

When Chinggis Khan, the progenitor of the archetype Mongol conquerors, died he gave instructions to his four sons to conquer earth. It was Batu, who received instructions to conquer the northern areas of earth, which were to the northwest of the Pacific Ocean. The names of the Mongol Hordes ( lit. encampment) were directed from the color system of the steppe, the cardinal directions, and the north was the color blue. The Blue Horde, which fell into Batu’s destiny, embarked with roughly 150,000 warriors into Russia in 1223.

The Mongols were absent of any institution but a nomadic and hunter culture that became militaristic, invented the highest-weapon technology of the day, and decided to take advantage of it. The immediate impact on Russia was if a city didn’t pay tribute it would be sacked. A crude census, a crude cadastral survey, and a verbal or later written treaty on an annual tribute were the institutions (policies) that Mongols initially presented to the Russians. The Mongols did not live among the Russians, but stayed to themselves outside the cities they subjugated.

The cultural impact that the Mongols had on the Russian can be argued with little relevance. The issues of brutality, for example, were not Mongolian in origin. The Mongols showed plenty of this on many towns and cites, however, Russian were brutal for centuries so this would never have been a cultural or political impact on the Russians. The Mongols practiced capital punishment. However, this practice had been around for all major world culture since time began. This impact cannot be seen as transferred. The idea of kingship has been argued as something that was transferred. This impact cannot be transferred because during the Kievan times there were Grand Princes, the equivalent of Khans (kings). The word Tsar is later argued but the argument took place after the conversion.

The idea of the postal system is often argued. This could well have been an idea the Russians adopted. For all it is worth, the Blood-Sweating Horses could also be used, instead of military duty, to transfer vital messages quickly along postal roads that were built. The Military was actually adopted because the Russians could not compete with the Mongols. They had to adopt their tactics in order to have a chance to compete.

Mongol eating practices, which can be considered cultural, were not transferred to the Russians. When each Mongol traveled, he or she took more than one horse and sometimes many. Mongols ate their horses, placed raw meat under their saddles, in part to complete two objectives: one to tenderize the meat and two to remain in the saddle. Periodically throughout the day a Mongol ripped off slabs of meat and placed them into their mouths remaining on their horses. Meat did not constitute their entire diet, but it made up the bulk of the protein needed to survive.

Mongol religion was not transferred to the Russian peoples. Mongols practiced what could be said to be their own interpretation of Shamanism. A type of ritualistic magic combined with nature worship. When the Mongols ran into the Tatars in northern littoral of the Black Sea prior to the Russian campaigns they had a hard time understanding the worship of a man, Muhammad. Chinggis’ said explanation to his Hordes before he died exclaimed whatever religion one should run into out in the world do not let it dominate you but propose the conquest’s aim as the provision for this journey to riches. Toleration of other’s religion enforced Mongol’s understanding not so much to let it dominate the main goal of conquest. Before the Uzbeg Khan’s reign, and understanding the lack of Chronicle embellishment before the Mongol- Tatar adoption of Islam, we cannot see an accurate picture if the Mongols had already adopted the elaborate institutions of Islam.

Not much is known about the Mongol Period in Russia. The Novgorodian Chronicle only expresses the concern of who were the conquerors. Chronicle writing declined. Chronicles do not begin to address the conquerors until their adoption of Islam. In this venue, we cannot assess the real impact of the Mongols onto Russian history. It becomes an issue of Islamic institutions. Whatever impact the Islamic Mongol-Tatar institutions had, the cultural impact, the political impact or the economic impact can never be judged in a real Mongol-Tatar light. Historiography has proven to blend these two distinctive principles together and argued a general statement which cannot be addressed legitimately, if we ask ourselves what was the Mongol impact on Russia?

Islam was an elaborate and well institutionalized system of cultural, political, and economic functionalities by the time the Mongol-Tatars adopted it. Islam’s social and political institutions had written doctrines, on substantive law, including treatises, legal formularies, judges and jurists who could look on authority of established sources, consultation of experts before rendering judicial opinions, complex criminal codes, including important concepts of collective responsibility, capital punishment, and laws on slavery, tax regulation, social behavior, and religious worship. In the Russian chronicles some Mongol-Tatars drank, which was forbidden, but mostly they adhered to the new institutional formulas.

Therefore, from the 14^th century onward, which is where most of the Russian Chronicles of the Mongol-Tatars address in their records, it remains here that the impact on Russian culture, politics, and economics was considered by historians. Mongol-Tatars became a continuum under the Islamic influence. Charles Halperin, in his work The Tatar Yoke, did however, express the difference. In fact, he stressed it as the main point in all historiography. He does not believe that any Mongol-Tatar impact on Russia happened after the Golden Horde’s conversion to Islam. It is equally important to stress the difference between the Mongols and the Mongols who had adopted Islam. One had primitive, if no institutions at all, and the other had extensive elaborate institutions that date back for centuries. To conclude, the Mongol-Tatar cultural, political and economical impact on Russian before the Islamic conversion was minimal.

( Now how do I express the revelation that many authors tie in the Mongol-Tatar with the period of Islam where institutions’ and advanced cultural ideas existed? )

Impact Arguments: Mongols

Riasanovsky = no impact besides destruction and subjection.

Trubetzkoy = argues after Islam has been adopted?

Michel Roublev = tax system was an institution (how so? Give me the money or I sack your city? ) He must be arguing after Islam had been adopted.

Vernadsky = argues after Islam has been adopted.

Cherniavsky = argues after Islam has been adopted.

David Mackenzie & Michael W. Curran = ?

A. M. Sakharov = the Mongols halting artistic progress.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin = no impact whatsoever.

Piano Carpini = Total destruction.

Charles Halperin = any impact has to come before the Golden Horde’s conversion to Islam. He struggles but is honest in his approach.

Eurasian school = mostly argues after Islam has been adopted?

European school = very severe and negative view of Mongols, even though they come from Imperialistic states.

Notes: panegyrics: A formal eulogistic composition intended as a public compliment.

Prosopography: a study of a collection of persons or characters, esp. their appearances, careers, personalities, etc., within a historical, literary, or social context.

Political control of the Russian Princes from Sarai

Mikhail Yaroslavich, second son of Yaroslav III, fashioned himself as the first Grand Prince of all Rus’. Subsequently, Uzbeg Khan had given Yuri Danilovich, Prince of Moscow, the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir. Mikhail Yaroslavich, also held the title of Grand Prince of Vladimir and Tver. Both men wanted to legitimize their rule the way Vladimir had in Kiev in the 10^th Century by promoting their own metropolitan. Mikhail promoted his own metropolitan and Peter (d. December 20, 1326) was promoted by ( Other person). Consequently, Mikhail battled Yuri at Bortenevo on December 22, 1317 and defeated him in which upset Uzbeg who summoned Mikhail and had him killed at Sarai. With the fall of the competition, ecclesiastical legitimacy was passed-on to Moscow and now the central authority of the Slavs. Peter became the first metropolitan to reside in Moscow. In continuing fashion, “the Cathedral of the Dormition and several other stone churches were built by Ivan Kalita, Yury's successor, in the Moscow Kremlin” to symbolize this new Muscovite ecclesiastical dominion, just as Vladimir had once envisioned legitimacy by use of the ecclesiastical symbolism. (wiki). Ecclesiastical dominion was one principle in Muscovy’s rise to power.

According to some scholars, Ivan Kalita, was the prototype of provident Moscow Princes. Ivan Kalita, Riasnaovsky points out, ransomed prisoners from the Mongols, purchase appanages from bankrupted princes, made political alliances, and won the right for tax collection from the khan of other princes. This way he became wealthy and began to buy lands. Ivan Kalita means “John money bags.” (91) Even expanding his own domain, his son Simeon won the rights form the Golden Horde the title of grand prince, and Simeon began to reference himself as grand prince of “ all of Russia.” (R91) Kalita also took measures to move the religious center to Moscow as discussed above.

Halperin, Charles, J., Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).
Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. & Mark D. Steinberg, History of Russia, vol. I. ed. 7^th, (Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2005).

The Role of the Mongols in Russian History – Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. & Mark D. Steinberg, History of Russia

Thus, the Mongol rule over the Russians lasted, with a greater or a lesser degree of effectiveness, for almost 250 years. There exists, however, no consensus among specialists concerning the role of the Mongols in Russian history. Traditionally Russian historians have paid little attention to the Mongols and their Impact on Russia; nevertheless, some of them did stress the destructive and generally negative influence of the Mongol invasion and subjugation. Others Virtually dismissed the entire matter as of minor significance in the historical development of their country. While a few earlier scholars held radically different views, a thorough reconsideration of the problem of the Mongols and Russia occurred only in the twentieth century among Russian émigré intelctuals. A new, so-called Eurasian, school proclaimed the fundamental affiliation of Russia with parts of Asia and brought the Mongol period of Russian history to the center of interest. What is more, the Eurasian school interpreted the Mongol impact largely in positive and creative terms. Their views, particularly as expressed in Vernadsky’s historical works, have attracted considerable attention.
The destructive and generally negative influence of the Mongols on the course of Russian history has been amply documented. To begin with, the Mongol invasion itself brought wholesale devastation and massacre to Russia. The sources, both Russian and non-Russian, tell, for instance, of a complete extermination of population in such towns as Riazan, Torzhok, and Kozelsk, while in others those who survived the carnage became slaves. A Mongol chronicle states that Batu and his lieutenants destroyed the towns of the Russians and killed or captured all their inhabitants. A papal legate and famous traveleg Archbishop Piano Carpini, who crossed southern Russia in 1245—16 on his way to Mongolia, wrote as follows concerning the Mongol invasion of Russia:

they went against Russia and enacted a great massacre in the Russian land, they destroyed towns and fortresses and killed people, they besieged Kiev which had been the capital of Russia, and after a long siege they took it and killed the inhabitants of the city; for this reason, when we passed through that land, we found lying in the field countless heads and bones of dead people; for this city had been extremely large and very populous, whereas now it has been reduced to nothing: barely two hundred houses stand there, and those people are held in the harshest slavery.

These and other similar contemporary accounts seem to give a convincing picture of the devastation of the Mongol invasion even if we allow for possible exaggeration.
The Mongol occupation of the southern Russian steppe deprived the Russians for centuries of much of the best land and contributed to the shift of population, economic activity, and political power to the northeast. It also did much to cut Russia off from Byzantium and in part from the West, and to accentuate the relative isolation of the country typical of the time. It has been suggested that, but for the Mongols, Russia might well have participated in such epochal European developments as the Renaissance and the Reformation. The financial exactions of the Mongols laid a heavy burden on the Russians precisely when their impoverished and dislocated economy was least prepared to bear it. Rebellions against the Mongol taxes led to new repressions and penalties. The entire period, and especially the decades immediately following the Mongol invasion, acquired the character of a grim struggle for survival, with the advanced and elaborate Kievan style of life and ethical and cultural standards in rapid decline. We learn of new cruel punishments established by law, of illiterate princes, of an inability to erect the dome of a stone cathedral, and of other clear signs of cultural regression. Indeed, certain historians have estimated that the Mongol invasion and domination of Russia retarded the development of the country by some 150 or 200 years.

Constructive, positive contributions of the Mongols to Russian history appear, by contrast, very limited. A number of Mongolian words in the fields of administration and finance have entered the Russian language, indicating a degree of influence. For example, the term iarlyk, which means in modern Russian a trademark or a customs stamp, comes from a Mongol word signifying a written order of the khan, especially the khan’s grant of privileges; similarly the Russian words denga, meaning coin, and dengi, money, derive from Mongolian. The Mongols did take a census of the Russian population. They have also been credited with affecting the evolution of Russian military forces and tactics, notably as applied to the cavalry. Yet even these restricted Mongol influences have to be qualified. The financial measures of the Mongols together with the census and the Mongol roads added something to the process of centralization in Russia. Yet these taxes had as their aim an exaction of the greatest possible tribute and as such proved to be neither beneficial to the people nor lasting. The invaders replaced the old “smoke” and “plough” taxes with the cruder and simpier head tax, which did not at all take into account one’s ability to pay. This innovation disappeared when Russian princes, as intermediaries, took over from the Mongol tax collectors. Thinking simply in terms of pecuniary profit, the Mongols often acted with little wisdom: they sold the position of grand prince to the highest bidder and in the end failed to check in time the rise of Moscow. Rampant corruption further vitiated the financial policy of the Mongols. As to military matters, where the invaders did excel, the fact remains that Russian armies and tactics of the appanage period, based on foot soldiers, evolved directly from those of Kiev, not from the Mongol cavalry. That cavalry, however, was to influence later Muscovite gentry horse formations.

Similarly, the Mongols deserve only limited credit for bringing to Russia the postal service or the practice of keeping women in seclusion in a separate part of the house. A real postal system came to Russia as late as the seventeenth century, and from the West; the Mongols merely resorted to the Kievan practice of obligating the local population to supply horses, carriages, boats, and other aids to communication for the use of officials, although they did implement this practice widely and bequeath several words in the field of transportation to the Russians. The seclusion of women was practiced only in the upper class in Russia; it probably reflected the general insecurity of the time to which the Mongols contributed their part rather than the simple borrowing of a custom from the Mongols. The Mongols themselves, it might be added, acquired this practice late in their history when they adopted the Muslim faith and some customs of conquered peoples.

Turning to the more far-reaching claims made, especially by scholars of the Eurasian school, on behalf of the Mongols and their impact on Russia, one has to proceed with caution. Although numerous and varied, Eurasian arguments usually center on the political role of the Mongols. Typically they present the Muscovite tsar and the Muscovite state as successors to the Mongol khan and the Golden Horde, and emphasize the influence of the Mongols in transforming weak and divided appanage Russia into a powerful, disciplined, and monolithic autocracy. Institutions, legal norms, and the psychology of Muscovite Russia have all been described as a legacy of Jenghiz Khan.

Yet, these claims can hardly stand analysis. As already mentioned, the Mongols kept apart from the Russians, limiting their interest in their unwilling subjects to a few items, notably the exaction of tribute. Religion posed a formidable barrier between the two peoples, both at first when the Mongols were still pagan and later when the Golden Horde became Muslim. The Mongols, to repeat a point, were perfectly willing to leave the Russians to their own ways; indeed, they patronized the Orthodox Church.

Perhaps a still greater significance attaches to the fact that the Mongol and the Russian societies bore little resemblance to each other. The Mongols remained nomads in the clan stage of development. Their institutions and laws could in no wise be adopted by a much more complex agricultural society. A comparison of Mongol law, the code of Jenghiz Khan, to the Pskov Sudebnik, an example of Russian law of the appanage age, makes the difference abundantly clear. Even the increasing harshness of Russian criminal law of the period should probably be attributed to the conditions of the time rather than to borrowing from the Mongols. Mongol influence on Russia could not parallel the impact of the Arabs on the West, because, to quote Pushkin, the Mongols were “Arabs without Aristotle and algebra”—or other cultural assets.

The Eurasian argument also tends to misrepresent the nature of the Mongol states. Far from having been particularly well organized, efficient or lasting, they turned out to be relatively unstable and short-lived. Thus, in 1260 Kublai Khan built Peking and in 1280 he completed the conquest of southern China, but in 1368 the Mongol dynasty was driven out of China; the Mongol dynasty in Persia lasted only from 1256 to 1344; and the Mongol Central Asiatic state with its capital in Bukhara existed from 1242 until its destruction by Tamerlane in 1370. In the Russian case the dates are rather similar, but the Mongols never established their own dynasty in the country, acting instead merely as overlords of the Russian princes. While the Mongol states lasted, they continued on the whole to be rent by dissensions and wars and to suffer from arbitrariness, corruption, and misrule in general. Not only did the Mongols fail to contribute a superior statecraft, but they had to borrow virtually everything from alphabets to advisers from the conquered peoples to enable their states to exist. As one of these advisers remarked, an empire could be won on horseback, but not ruled from the saddle. True, cruelty, lawlessness, and at times anarchy, in that period characterized also the life of many peoples other than the Mongols, the Russians included. But at least most of these peoples managed eventually to surmount their difficulties and organize effective and lasting states. Not so the Mongols, who, after their sudden and stunning performance on the world scene, receded to the steppe, clan life, and the internecine warfare of Mongolia.

When the Muscovite state emerged, its leaders looked to Byzantium for their high model, and to Kievan Russia for their historical and still meaningfd heritage. As to the Mongols, a single attitude toward them pervades all Russian literature: they were a scourge of God sent upon the Russians for their sins. Historians too, whether they studied the growth of serfdom, the rise ot the gentry, or the nature of princely power in Muscovite Russia, established significant connections with the Russian past and Russian conditions, not with Mongolia. Even for purposes of analogy, European countries stood much closer to Russia than Mongol states. In fact, from the Atlantic to the Urls absolute monarchies were in the process of replacing feudal division. Therefore, Vernadsky’s affirming the importance of the Mongol impact by contrasting Muscovite with Kievan Russia appears to miss the point. There existed many other reasons for changes in Russia; and, needless to say, other countries changed during those centuries without contact with the Mongols.

It is tempting, thus, to return to the older view and to consider the Monngol3 gols as of little significance in Russian history. On the other hand, their destructive impact deserves attention. And they, no doubt, contributed something to the general harshness of the age and to the burdensome and exacting nature of the centralizing Muscovite state which emerged out of this painful back ground. Mongol pressure on Russia and its resources continued after the end of the yoke itself, for one of the authentic legacies of Jenghiz Khan proved to be the successor states to the Golden Horde which kept southeastern Russia under a virtual state of siege and repeatedly taxed the efforts of the entire country.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. & Mark D. Steinberg, History of Russia, vol. I. ed. 7^th, (Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2005), 67-71.

Questions on Interpretations.

Questions? Halperin believes that Russian elite liked the Mongols, (see 105-6 Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History), indicating different classes of sentiment. He argues that The Primary Chronicles were racist and not a reflection of Russian classes in general, written possibly by monks, or high-clergy with a bias – so why then if Persia and South Asia adopted much of the Mongol custom in the 16^th century, then didn’t Russia continue with Mongol culture in the same manner? We know that the main Mongol Empire consisted of much of the Russian region, As Nicholas V. Riasnaovsky illustrates with maps and logistics, and their presence was felt significantly for at least 100 years and longer directly in Russian cites. I fail to understand Halperin’s logic? Why did Russians in general finally battle the Mongol tribes eventually to recover their taken land if they liked them so much and this is referenced by Halperin’s belief that Religious bias in the Chronicles didn’t reflect Russian society as a whole?

Halperin argues “Tatars as perhaps capable of nobility, honesty, or simply humanity” were destroyed because of the Christian God ( i.e. the Orthodox Church never accepted them, they instead demonized the Mongols which created a social undercurrent of resistance to the ‘Mongol Yoke‘ to eventually reject them and prefer Orthodox ways and thusly fight, die and sacrifice their lives to take back their lands) (Halperin, 118).

Halperin to justify his argument refers to many points, of which one is that Russians married into Mongols clans forming political alliances. This showed according to them they were on friendly basis. It is true that in some major battles the Mongols fought on both sides of the line, including sometimes fighting alongside the Russians against their rivals in the west. Donskoi’s victory over Mamai at Kulikovo Field can be cited as one prime example. The princely strife following this period saw a Mongol expedition, aided by Muscovite troops, devastated Tver in 1327. (R 91) This shows a more complex understanding of the period as Halperin points out but not necessarily the entire period of Mongol hegemony: Halperin ‘phenomenon theme’ of brotherly friendship is given:

“Relations came to include a variety of more of less friendly cooperative interactions, such that a Mongol Khan might be the benevolent father-in-law of a Russian prince of the just defender of a Russian monastery. This state of affairs constituted in itself a phenomenon of medieval Russian social history.” (Halperin, 118)

Complex situations existed in which both Mongols and Russian had to interact with one another for survival of their interests. This doesn’t mean Mongols in general were friends of the Russians - individuals, yes, as a whole? No. It was more a symbiotic relationship set on an ideal of survival. Halperin doesn’t illustrate the difference between Russian and Mongols relations of the later period, a political evolution of some later members of the Mongols to act in benevolence, and of a memory of the death and destruction of the early Mongol leaders.

How does this affect later Russian ‘sprit’ which is not connected to Religiosity but to memory? Surly not all Mongol leaders were of the same vision as the earlier Mongols who made a policy of death and destruction in the initial incursions into Russia and the west. Yet, memory persists with the Russians because instead of battling armies for controls of cities, the initial Mongol Princes slaughtered innocent people to the point of depopulation in some areas as Riasnaovsky illustrates. Was this a necessary tactic in history for conquering lands? No. It was argued in Riasnaovsky’s History of Russia that after the Mongols had initially conquered a town or city, some places they killed everyone, including women and children. How does this affect memory and emotional resolve for Russians? Halperin doesn’t take this aspect into consideration. He does point out folktales and songs recall the morbid history and people engaged in its ritual not to forget the past wrongs done to them. He does account for the so-called demonization in the Chronicles, written by clergy. However, if the Russian elite liked the Mongols as Halperin believes then why was there a policy of ‘Gathering of Lands’ which was aimed at ridding the ‘Mongol Yoke’? One needs to ask these questions to get an accurate picture to what went on in the minds of Russians. I argue that it was the memory and not the Church that created the resurgence of the Russians to take back their lands, in spite of Christian rhetoric which was used as a tool, not as the motive.

It is true to Halperin that the Mongols changed Russian society from what it was in Kievan Rus’ period to the Muscovy period, with an adoption of a wider comprehensive tax structure, a census and cadastral assessment, postal service (Riasnaovsky disagrees History of Russia 69), a possibly direct influence on restructuring the recovery of the economic recession before the Mongols came in due to a change in western trade preferences, and population shifts, and Lithuanian then Polish political influence on parts of western populations during the last period of Keivan Rus’. The Mongols cannot be whole blamed for the decline of Kievan Rus’.

To show religious benevolence of the Mongol tribes Halperin points out the difference in tolerance to that of Orthodox Christianity. The Mongols adopted Islam early on, about the 14^th century. They didn’t adhere to the non-drinking laws of Islam, but this didn’t bother them in their religiosity. Halperin justified his argument citing Chinngis Khan decreed religious toleration; therefore, it was the Christians that were opposed to cooperation – who didn’t want to get along. It was the Christians who were at fault here. This is contradicted by the evidence that Christian Russians rejected the Mongol culture, which Muslim Persia and Muslim South Asia necessarily didn’t reject in a following period in history.

To show that Halperin continually contradicts himself, we look to some of his specific passages. The Mongol impact on different social levels is described by him with his referencing of the Russian peasant class. He argues, peasants did not understand Christianity, their only jobs were slaves, or forced labor under the Mongols? This indicated, along with a reference that most of the peasants were pagan until well after the Mongols left, they had no agency in their feelings for the Mongols because they didn’t understand Christianity’s rejection of them as the elite understood it. Did they like their condition nonetheless? Halperin leaves this analysis out in this passage but then in another he addresses this point that Christianity did mean something to the peasants. He argued that the increase in wealth and influence on Roman Orthodox Church under Tatar aegis and accompany spread of Christianity in rural Russia must also have affected peasant life (H60) If Christianity affected the peasantry, is Halperin suggesting that the eventual of ridding the Mongols form Russian lands now took on a wider acceptance for the commoner because of the Russian Religiosity?

Halperin references many Russian schools of thoughts, but the above are not references to them, these are his conclusions. Besides Halperin’s religious argument, he references some scholars which show interesting subject matter. For instance, Halperin quoting Horace W. Dewey,”Kingship and Poruka before Peter the Great” “ describes the practice of Poruka, a collective responsibility for the behavior of members of a sworn group, and this became more common in Russia during the Mongol period, perhaps because the Mongols used the idea of collective responsibility widely”. (H93) This can show a direct transference of Mongols culture; but Halperin needs to understand this was an Islamic policy that grew out of centuries of formulation way before the Mongols arrived in history. Collective responsibility was a long political process of how Muslim managed their populations, including Muslims. The fact that Halperin cites many tribes of the Mongols adopted Islam in the 14^th century gives weight to this political policy as it would not have been foreign to them. The Ottomans were practicing collective responsibility for their peoples at this time as well. They had adopted Islam as well. For the Russians to adopt this policy can only mean they saw it as beneficial to them, not that they accepted Islam.

In regards of the positive effects of the Mongols in Russian history, Riasnaovsky cites some authors who believed that if it wasn’t for the ‘Mongol Yoke’ “ the entire period, and especially the decades immediate following the Mongol invasion, acquired the character of a grim struggle for survival, with the advanced and elaborate Kievan style of life and ethical and cultural standards in rapid decline.”( R68) and this “ It has been suggested that , but for the Mongols, Russia might well have participated in such epochal European developments as the Renaissance and the Reformation.” (R68) He cites the financial exactions of the Mongols laid a heavy burden on the Russians precisely when their impoverished and dislocated economy was least prepared to bear it. (R68) Riasnaovsky also cites contemporaries that witness the death and destruction. Archbishop Plano Carpini, who crossed southern Russia in 1245-46 on his way to Mongolia wrote the following concerning the Mongol invasion of Russia:

… they went against Russia and enacted a great massacre in the Russian land, they destroyed towns and fortresses and killed people, they besieged Kiev which had been the capital of Russia, and after a long siege they took it and killed the inhabitants of the city; for this reason, when we passed through that land, we found lying in the field countless heads and bones of dead people; for this city had been extremely large and very populous, whereas now it has been reduced to nothing: barely two hundred houses stand there, and those people are held in the harshest slavery. (R 68)

The Legend of Genghis Khan, N.S. Trubetzkov addresses the resurgence against Mongol overlorship, in his work Major Problems in the History of Imperial Russia, Russia and Europe. His thesis is the political unification of Russia under the power of Moscow was a direct result of Tatar Yoke. His argument has noting to do with Religiosity, but more with a ‘spirit’ of people wanting to free themselves from overlordship they saw as burdensome. Since the elite were the major driving force for the reconquest, due to them having money, horses, and influence, we can suggest that Trubetzkov doesn’t see the elite as friendly as Halperin did with the Mongols.

Riasnaovsky argues that the Eurasian school, all numerous and varied, believe that Muscovy was a direct result of the Mongols transforming a weak and divided appanage Russia into a powerful, disciplined, and monolithic autocracy (R69). He claims that “one needs to proceed with caution” when addressing this problem. (R69) Riasnaovsky’s analysis that the Mongols kept apart form Russians, which points to a disagreement with Halperin’s “benevolent father-in-law” analysis, created a barrier between the two people. He also duly notes that very few Mongol words crossed over into Russian language and indicating those only economic terms, which were mainly the Mongol’s subjugating goal, were kept.

The Positive lasting affects cited by Halperin do not carry weight with Riasnaovsky. He illustrates that the Eurasian school had made it appear the Mongols were organized, efficient and long lasting, but they turned out to be relatively unstable and short-lived.( R70) He references “Kubli Khan built Peking and in 1280 he completed the of southern China, but in 1368 the Mongol dynasty was driven out of China; the Mongol dynasty in Persia lasted only from 1256 to 1344; and the Mongol Central Asiatic State with its capital in Bukhara existed from 1232 until its destruction by Tamerlane in 1370.” (70) However, Riasnaovsky fails to cite the Mūghals (Mongols) who dominated South Asia (most of India and Bangladesh) well into the 17^th century. However, Riasnaovsky makes it a point to state that Mongols never established a dynasty in Russia, as were the cases in these regions just referenced. They acted more as overlords and overlords administer a less hands –on approach in civil administrative functionaries. This appears to be the case when the Mongols gave tax collection rights to princes and decided not to venture themselves into many cities. The Mongols chose to stay out of Russian cities as direct administrative officials. The question arises, how much real transference, and influence really have on Russia?

Halperin, Charles J, Russia and the Golden Horde: the Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. & Mark D. Steinberg, History of Russia, vol. I. ed. 7^th, (Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2005).

Rise of Moscow -Trubetzkoy

Thus, the external history of the “ rise of Moscow,” or the beginning of the Russian state, can be depicted in the following manner. The Tatars looked upon Russian state they had conquered as a single province. From the perspective of the Tatar state system, the financial and administrative unification of the Russian province was much to be desired. The Muscovite princes took this task upon themselves, and in doing so they were champions of the Horde’s political strategy and agents representing the central Tatar government. (Trubetzkoy 27). Trubetzkoy, N. S., The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, ed. Anatoly Liberman, trans. Kenneth Brostrom ( Ann Arbor : Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991).

((((((((IVAN THE TERRIBLE NOTES((((((((((( In 1928 M.N. Pokrovskii, his old enemy, mislabeled Platonov in the Granat Encyclopedia as an "monarchist" one of four typical old typed of "old" historians. January 1930, Platonov and twenty other scholars were arrested, as a participant in the overthrow of the Soviet Regime and place Grand Duke Andrie Vladimirovich on the Russian throne. The charge drew an outcry of absurdness, and Platonov was subjected to twenty months of endless humilation while under arrest, as vividly described in R.I. Ivanov-Razumnik's Jails and Exiles.

The Soviet regime never "rehabilitated " Platonov. A review of his work took place in 1930s but L. Ivanov, writing in Istorik-marksist ( Marxist Historian), 1938, no. 4,p. 156 noted: We recognize the accumulated mass of factual information, but sweep aside his interpretations." ( Encyclopedia 117)

PLatonov initiated a new "school" of Russian historiography -- men who rote detailed monographs based upon on exhaustive archival research and analysis, with litte regard for current politics or grand architectonic historical schemes. PLatonov viewd himself as a "technician," a discoverer of facts and a painter of historical pictures, not a philosopher of history or politician manque. Platonov's History of Russia were leading high school and university textbooks in the Russian Empire for more than two decades. (Enc 114).

Platonov's memoirs of his students years expressed his life-long suspicion of materialism, his aversion to political life and party organization, and his inability to function effectively in collective enterprise. ( enc 115)

In his Moscow school years Platonov portrayed his Tsars as strong men who served the state not private, clan, or class interest. Tsars were major creators of the historical process, although at times they were overwhelmed by events.

PLatonov, his father a painter, and was a grandson of a serf. His first post was a teacher in a private women's school run by A.K. Neidgard. Beginning in 1883 he read lectures for 33 years in the higher women's courses organized by Bestuzhev-Riumin, and in 1884-89 he taught at Petrov school of St. Pertersburg Merchant's Society...

Most of Platonov's works are related to the Time of Troubles

Ivan the Terrible’s methodology is similar to his doctoral dissertation in 1901, the Ocherki. This was a move away from the St. Petersburg school of historiography and reflected the influence of the Moscow school of historiography and its ways of thinking. So did Platonov's method of classification and systematization, his searching for social and geographical base for each group and phenomenon of the Smuta.

Destruction of the state order, the struggle of the Russian people against foreign enemies and domestic traitors, the struggle of the lower classes against the landlords.

He devided the era into three priods, and subduivided themes into eight "moments."

Work Cited and Readings:

Halperin, Charles J, Russia and the Golden Horde: the Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

Halperin, Charles J., The Tatar Yoke (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishing Inc., 1985)

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. & Mark D. Steinberg, History of Russia, vol. I. ed. 7^th, (Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2005).

Trubetzkoy, N. S., The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity, ed. Anatoly Liberman, trans. Kenneth Brostrom ( Ann Arbor : Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991).

Bibliography:

Charles J. Halperin, “Russia and the Golden Horde: the Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

Charles J. Halperin, “The Tatar Yoke” (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishing Inc., 1985).

David Mackenzie & Michael W. Curran, “A History of Russia, the Soviet Union and Beyond,” 6^th ed. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993).

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky & Mark D. Steinberg, “History of Russia,” vol. I., 7^th ed. (Oxford: Oxford Unity Press, 2005).

Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetzkoy, “The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia’s Identity” , ed. Anatoly Liberman, trans. Kenneth Brostrom ( Ann Arbor : Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991).