US - China Feild Reports 1941- 1949

			US - China Field Reports Copyright © 2008 Michael Johnathan McDonald
			University of California, Berkeley, History 124B, research paper, By Michael J. McDonald, May 5, 2008. (undergraduate) Below is the source Joseph McCarthy had used but not disclosed to implicate the U.S. Administration in complicity with the Chinese Communists and against the Chinese Capitalists. It was the diary of the U.S. Commanding General published without his consent by his wife to clear his name – because it was F. D. Roosevelt who, and some of his officials, had micromanaged the eastern theater during World War II. The importance to understanding this dilemma pertains to Roosevelt‘s micromanagement of the eastern theater and non-micromanagement of the European theater during World War II. In order to cover his tracts, so-to-speak, Roosevelt had a young military officer revise the historical record. By revising the historical record, Joseph McCarthy could not figure out the real occurrences, and therefore had to admit he could not reveal his sources to the public. In order to undercover this historical dilemma, I decided to triangulate and quadangulate both Chinese and U.S.A. sources. It is from this methodology that dates of the communications could be line up between the Chinese commanding General, The President of The United States of America and the United States of American General in Burmese. By matching up the Chinese commanding General’s diary entries, and cross-referencing them to the President’s communiqué to him and separately to the U.S. General’s, and cross-referencing the U.S. General’s diary with the communiqué of The President of the United States of America, and then cross-referencing the communiqué between the two generals -- a clearer picture of actually what went on in China that convinced and confused Joseph McCarthy to take his message to the American public becomes quite clear. Joseph McCarthy did not have the luxury of the Chinese General’s diary at his disposal. This original diary is now in the hands of Stanford University. It is a valuable source for vindicating Joseph McCarthy’s claims and correcting history’s ideological whistleblower. Odd Arne Westad in his book “The Global Cold War” (2007) intends President Truman had “detested the inefficiency, corruption, and brutality that he saw in Jiang’s Goumindang regime. […].[1]These views simply are repeated in the early NSA/22 series of the NSC 34 government secret report of 1948. The early NSC reports were ongoing drafts and comprised selective views. Its audience was to the U.S. military and heads of state. The U.S. had only a few reporters and a small number of government officials inside China during its intervention (1941-1946). These views do not reflect the “whole” of the Chinese people or the American people, as the report intended. This report represented a nation only forming its ideology. This paper does not argue the merits of communism or democracy. It argues the U.S. government overextended itself and underestimated the situation it got its self into, and sought a self interest policy rather than a policy of quid pro quo. To rationalize its failures it revised the historical record – it placed the blame onto the KMT. When U.S. government sought out the Chinese Communists, it was not ideological but tactical. However, the KMT saw itself in Chinese history well before the U.S. intervened[2] in 1941, as solely ideological. The U.S. government simply failed to understand this, and dug itself deeper into Chinese politics until it reached a crisis point in 1946, left a country in crisis, and later analyzed its mistakes and formed an ideology. As Westad intends, U.S. domestic public opinion in lieu of the loss of China by 1950 was replaced with the “ideological commitment and military strategy.”[3] Westad is correct that in post-war China, the U.S. government was only forming the future U.S. Cold War policies predicated upon ideological lines. The loss of China, as issue of the 1950s congressional hearings on China, was focused upon the lost economic opportunities. As historian Franz Sherman understood it, Bill Knowland decried the economic lost opportunities in China.[4] For Knowland, it was not ideological, but business. The east was “to be” the continuance of western expansion. The Oakland port stood at an advantage. From 1941 onward, the U.S. government had known that the Kuomintang’s (KMT) main aim in post dynastic China was to establish China’s first democracy with free-market capitalism. When World War II broke out, The U.S. took advantage of the KMT’s predicament for its own interests. Eric Larrabee in his book,“Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War” (1987), suggests that Roosevelt had micromanaged the war and continually threatened Chiang Kai-shek[5] to halt military aid. Roosevelt held the very existence and survivability of the KMT forces with constant threats if the KMT did not aggressively attack. A policy recommended by the Joint Chiefs (JCS), George C. “Marshall on their authority instructed Stilwell to inform the Chinese military that if Yoke Force did not attack, all Lend-Lease shipments to it would cease” […].[6] The Japanese forces were western trained, superior in armament, and had the advantage of eastern geography to the Salween River. The Chinese forces were sick, under trained, and had no modern weapons before 1944. Roosevelt had underestimated the success of the powerful Japanese forces. When the radio messages became stern, Chiang would attack, but attain heavy loses – which demoralized his units. The U.S. commanding General[7] wrote in his journals that the British, U.S. advisors, and the Chinese[8] did not believed the KMT’s forces could attack the Japanese, [9] and by late as 1944 were fighting the Communist armies as well.[10] Roosevelt, firmly Chiang’s ally, never promised him support for the coming civil war – he was there to be used to lessen the number of Japanese soldiers. This was accomplished by the carrot and the stick approach.[11] The Japanese had cut-off all finances and food to the Chinese Nationalists. Chiang simply had nowhere else to go continue to fight to unify the country. He would simply wait out the war in Burma. But as Chiang received constant U.S. commitments, he saw this as political pressure to enter the U.S.’s side. Larrabee argues that this was Roosevelt’s “keep-China-in-the-war mentality,”[12] and that they did not want Chiang to know that “Americans had overreached themselves.”[13] To counter this, Roosevelt kept in secret contact with Chiang to offer him viable alternatives to keep him in the war, alienating Marshal, Stimson,[14] Stilwell and Churchill. These men believed Chiang did not do what he was demanded too – from their standpoint – a secret policy of go out and sacrifice Chinese men and himself to die on the battlefield to lessen the number of Japanese forces so the U.S and British could sacrifice less of their men and military equipment. This view helped frame the KMT as inefficient, corrupt and brutal, by General Stilwell,[15] and this view is replicated in the early NSA/22 Series. Larabee intends by the time of the events of Chiang’s aide-mémoire, a culmination of problems with Stilwell, finalized Roosevelt’s resolve – to revise the historical record so he would not be blamed for losing China.[16] Broken commitments were commonplace. Roosevelt, desperate to keep the KMT in the Burmese theater fighting the Japanese, micromanaged the war, often communicated commitments he could not keep. One example showed that The United States had to divert resources to Russia and Cairo to help out the British. Chiang not knowing this continued to believe in the promised supplies. His men were dying, and Stilwell understood that Roosevelt placated Chiang with broken promises to buy time until the manufacturing of new supplies. However, when Chiang became aware of the broken promises, the Generalissimo blamed Stilwell of keeping secrets. Stilwell reacted in his journal entries on the 25th and the 26th of 1942: “The President had assured him the Tenth Air Force was for use in China. Why, then, was part of it diverted without notifying him? [Kai-shek]. He was fed up and couldn’t believe the President knew the facts.”[17] “Now what can I say to the G-mo? We fail in all of our commitments, and blithely tell him to just carry on, old top.”[18] Broken promises to the KMT would continue. While the U.S. government had a rationalization for the lack of supplies to the KMT, it continually lied about its commitments. This contradicts the claim of the NSC 34 report that the U.S. gave everything Kai-shek had been promised and he could not win. The NSC 34 report intends The U.S. government gave “all out aid” to the KMT forces.[19] Simply doing so was not in the interests of the U.S. British India received 180,000 tons per month of Lend Lease for protecting Churchill’s colonialism in Asia from a possible Japanese invasion, while the KMT received 3,000 tons per month,[20] which was then divided up and controlled by Stilwell who took most of it to further his own cause to shame Chiang. Stilwell wrote “If the G-mo controls distribution, I’m sunk. The Reds will get nothing. Only the G-mo’s henchmen will be supplied, and my troops will suck the hind tit.”[21] The leftover supplies were to be used for 4,000,000 peasant soldiers, who were under trained, sick, and poorly armed, as late as 1944.[22] Further, the Chinese Lend-Lease was often raided on its routs to its destination.[23] The amount of total calculation of funding for the Lend Lease to the KMT never reflected the sum amount of real material. Larabee argues by 1944 Roosevelt had little interest in China.[24] Broken promises continued. The KMT planned during the war to use the new and successful air program granted by Roosevelt, and the committed navel program to secure Manchuria,[25] and to secure Japanese military equipment once the Japanese surrendered. By early 1945, Chiang, military advisors, and the U.S. military knew it was only time before the Japanese would surrender. Before Truman, the Congress or the American public knew, Chiang wrote in his diary on March 15th, 1945: “has China really been sold out at Yalta?”[26] Ambassador Patrick Hurley to China had been in Washington, and Kai-shek contacted him to seek out the President. On April 3d, Hurley left for China. Roosevelt had denied to his face about the secret deal. Hurley’s curiosity pressed Roosevelt while he lay dying. The President finally confessed and led Hurley to the secret document, “Agreement regarding Japan.” He made a copy that explained all the duplicity, the deceit and securing of Stalin’s sovereignty-rights over Chinese territory that was against international law. “The president admitted that Hurley’s misgivings were justified.”[27] At the Cairo conference, Kai-shek was promised the return of all Chinese lands at the conclusion of the war.[28] When the Soviets entered Manchuria, the U.S. broke another commitment to the KMT. The U. S. government by simply framing KMT, as inefficient, corrupt, and brutal, was politically expedient. Hurley[29] resigned out of disgust. Westad intends the U.S. saw that the Chinese Communists “represented many values that the Americans admired: organization, discipline, self-sacrifice.”[30] The NSC 34 report reiterates these views.[31] These views partially came from General Stilwell,[32] and it was convenient for Roosevelt’s revision. “The publication in 1948 of The Stilwell Papers, a collection from his wartime journals and letters” was published without his permission.[33] In some undated journal entries, Stilwell wrote, I judge the Koumintang and Kungchantang [Communists] by what I saw. [KMT] Corruption, neglect, chaos, economy, taxes, words and deeds. Hording black market, trading with enemy. Communist program… reduce taxes, rents, interest. Raise production, and standard of living. Participate in government. Practice what they preach.” For the leader of the KMT, Chiang K’ai-shek, Stilwell wrote…”the military effort Chiang K’ai-shek made since 1938. It was practically zero.”[34] Stilwell’s journal reflects a man seeking career recognition.[35] The Chinese were to be used for his glory. When the KMT would not attack and sacrifice their lives by inadequate equipment or field conditions, Stilwell started to advocate aligning with the Communists to fight the Japanese. This led to enmity with Chiang whose mentor Sun Yat-sen’s original principle was never to allow communists to be represented within the Chinese military. Both never saw eye-to-eye from the beginning. Stilwell believed the KMT were similar to the Nazis. His behavior exhibited a conflict of interest with his ally and Roosevelt. Stilwell was very vocal in China about supporting the Reds. He wrote, “He can’t see that the mass of Chinese people welcome the Reds as being the only visible hope of relief from crushing taxation, the abuse of the Army [ from terror of] Tia Li’s Gestapo. Under Chiang K’ai-shek they now begin to see what they may expect. Greed, corruption, favoritism, more taxes, a ruined currency, terrible waste of life, callous disregard of all rights of men.”[36] Truman conclusions, for the KMT as “inefficiency, corruption, and brutality,” [37] developed under Stilwell’s sentiments. The U.S. policy, during the postwar era, was to broker a coalition government –The KMT and the Chinese Communists. However, Mao Tse-tung would not allow capitalists in his version of a coalition government.[38] Furthermore rape and accidental murder allegations against U.S. marines,[39] and ambushes by Communists against U.S. marines,[40] and other events and allegations soured the U.S.’s resolve. In Keiji Furuya’s monumental work “Chiang Kai-shek His Life and Times” (1981), he argues that the U.S. was part of massive misinformation and propaganda campaign by the Communists during the postwar period aimed at getting the U.S. out of China.[41] Joseph K.S. Yick in his monograph, “Making of Urban Revolution in China” (1995), uses newly released Chinese government documents to explain the success of the massive propaganda campaign by the Communists to oust the U.S. from China (1945-’46). Anti-Civil War movements that sprang up supported and organized by the Communists in major cities, aimed at academia, and students, who advocated the communist version of government as more democratic, egalitarian, and economically sound. Although Yick claims these movement’s numbers were in the population minority,[42] the international press gave their plight wider media coverage. They framed the U.S. as imperialists, murderers,[43] and the KMT as fascists. These groups acted as decolonization movements. Furuya claims these grass root movements had devastating effects on KMT troop moral and the U.S. Marshall mission.[44] On August 18th, 1946, President Truman placed an embargo[45] on China’s National Government, and on December 18th, 1946 the President wished the Kuomintang (KMT) well, the mission had failed.[46] Furuya intends Chiang viewed the U.S. embargo on military supplies, even foreign imports, had ultimately lost China. In June (1946), the U.S. had yet again committed to Lend Lease and economic aid to the KMT.[47] It was another broken commitment. Was the KMT really inefficient, corrupt and brutal? The NSC 34 report claims that “[I]t was not so much equipment which the Nationalists lacked as generalship, moral and the affirmative support of the population in whose midst they must operate.”[48] The March 29th, 1948, KMT national election brought out 250 million voters in massive support of democracy.[49] The majority of the population saw Chiang as a hero. It was China’s first democratic attempt. Truman’s embargo hurt all the Chinese people as a whole – in economic devastation after the war –a major complaint against the KMT and played a vital role their downfall. In 1949, with Soviet help, a massive military campaign against the KMT brought Mao Tse-tung to power.[50] Truman reacted in 1950s by having the U.S. 7th Fleet bomb the Chinese coastline and put in place a navel blockade. Prior to this event Tse-tung was still open for diplomatic U.S. relations. This event brought to a close the US-China relationship. The U.S official view of the KMT as inefficient, corrupt, and brutal regime reflected in the NSC 34 report would not last.[51] It did not represent a historiography of the U.S. failures to the KMT: broken promises, overextending itself, mismanagement. It blamed a faction of the Chinese people for its own mistakes. As Westad intends this first intervention set-off a repeated pattern during the Cold War of the government doubting the survivability of the state.[52] By the 1950s, the U.S. had begun to understand its ideological trajectory.[53] While the KMT was never seen as ideal, it however offered these vital insights into future U.S. intervention of “ideological commitment and military strategy.”[54] Chiang’s respect for the U.S. ideology of liberty never wavered. The U.S. proved this “new” commitment by supporting Chiang from Taiwan until his death in 1988. The NSC 34 report represented that the U.S. was still forming its ideology. [1] Westad, Odd Arne, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 112. [2] Westad differentiates between the wartime “involvement” and postwar “intervention.” I disagree, and believed through my arguments it was an intervention in the first place, albeit haphazardly and not conscious. The U.S. involved itself with the KMT by conflicting commitments from the beginning, and used the KMT’s desperate predicament to exploit them. It may have had honest pretensions, but by 1942 the U.S. government was breaking commitments often and constantly. [3] Ibid., The Global Cold War, p. 118. [4] Schurman, Franze, The Logic of Power: An Enquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Politics (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 65, 156, 158, 161,162, 170. [5] Leader of the Chinese National Government and Army, predicated on Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s teachings of freedom, liberty and capitalism as the only form of government for the Chinese people – post dynastic period. He took over as leader after Yat-sen. [6] Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New York: Harper & Roe, 1987), p. 564. [7] Stilwell, Joseph W, The Stilwell Papers, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1948), p.266. General Joseph Warren Stilwell, a three star General who received a fourth star during his infamous campaign. His own admittance in 1943 that he believed it was tragic, the situation he found himself in. “This has been a long uphill fight and when I think of some of our commanders who are handed ready-made, fully-equipped, well trained army of Americans to work with, it makes me wonder if I’m not working out some of my sins.” [8] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, Only four divisions out of thirty-nine were equipped with effectiveness between 1942-1944, p. 138. Stilwell had a personal interest to show his competitors he could take untrained peasants and form them into a world class military fighting machine. It was wishful thinking. Most of these sentiments are recorded in personal letters to his spouse throughout the journal. He names generals, diplomats, advisors and critiques throughout his journal, from British officers, to U.S. officers to Chinese officers who all doubted the Chinese army could face a battle proven opponent – even up until 1944, before his recall. His famous excursion with the Ledo [X-force] force (Jan. 1944- July 1944) is qualified. These were two special divisions he personally outfitted, trained and commanded. They did not, as he intends, represent the entire Chinese military that were mainly conscripted peasants. It is not until 1945 that the KMT began to conscript educated and middle class conscripts. Stilwell’s frustration is apparent by fate of having difficult conditions and circumstances in which he was continually pressured from U.S. higher-ups, including Marshall and Roosevelt to perform and both of whom were not on the military bases and could see the poverty and desperation of the conditions in Burma. Even initially (before Roosevelt pushed him) Churchill did not allow Stilwell or the Chinese army to train in India, fearful of a Japanese air attack. Sympathies toward Stilwell are evident in many historiographies of this period. [9] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p.184. Stilwell records in his journal for January 10th, 1942 “I was the only one to back the Chinese soldiers.[…] Maybe we’ll get our revenge on the little bastard.” This was Stilwell’ attempt to “get the War Department to be tough on” Chiang, but Chiang wanted Roosevelt to know the British had backed out of their promise to support his troops into battle, and he would not force his inexperienced troops up against the superior Japanese’s divisions alone. Stilwell reports Roosevelt’s reply to Chiang to hold on and do not go to war until he gets Churchill to respond to the British situation. Stilwell constantly wanted to take in the Chinese’s troops to battle, regardless if they could fight or not. [10] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, pp.324-325. See commentary by Theodore H. White. [11] Ibid.,, Commander in Chief, p. 564. [12] Ibid., Commander in Chief, p. 527. [13] Ibid., Commander in Chief, p. 573. [14] Henry L. Stimson. [15] General Joseph Warren Stilwell was the head commander under Chiang Kai-shek of the US-Chinese Nationalist army from 1942-1944. [16] Ibid., Commander in Chief, pp. 576-578. Chiang and Stilwell never got along. Stilwell constantly refused orders, and blamed Chiang, in which Roosevelt reacted against Chiang, which then Chiang reacted back and demanded either he or him must go, and Chiang sent this memorandum, a final in a series of communications as an ultimatum to Roosevelt, who then decided to recall Stilwell, to keep Chiang and the KMT in the war. It is at this point, Roosevelt lost all faith in his officers and the KMT and winning China. Larrabee suggests “Roosevelt’s political radar told him that if Chiang’s regime went down, he himself would be subject to partisan attack for having “lost” China (as his successor subsequently was). To prepare against this eventuality it would be prudent to have at hand an analysis of the historical record showing how hard the President had labored to sustain Chiang Kai-shek despite the latter’s failings.” The reports handed to a young navel officer by the President, composed in his map room on December 5 [1944] in addition to explaining the his reasons for recalling Stilwell. The report is sympathetic to all American officers, but it paints Chiang in a bad light. See George M. Elsey [the young naval officer in the Map Room who received the revised record from the President] “The President and U.S. Aid to China,” p. 53, with attachment from Roosevelt to Brown, MSS, FDR Library, in Larrabee, Eric, Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War (New York: Harper & Roe, 1987), p. 687, note 112. These events from Stilwell’s point of view are recorded in his journal; see The Stilwell Papers pp. 327-249. This was one of the most investigated cases about the U.S.’s involvement in China – and also the most polarizing. [17] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p.119. Stilwell’s journal entry, June 26, 1942, 11:00 am. [18] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p. 119. Stilwell's journal entry, June 25. The Stilwell Papers comprise the general’s journal entries during his time India, Burma and China with Chiang Kai-shek. They were published without his permission. Roosevelt had placed a gag-order on Stilwell when he came home to Carmel, California in 1944. This was done so Roosevelt would continue to ‘save face.’ Stilwell never talked about China, being a good U.S. soldier. These journal entries became vital to understanding the story behind this intervention to control the KMT for U.S. global interests. While all autobiographies and journals must be considered by historians with skepticism, constant themes occur over and over again in Stilwell’s journals. Roosevelt micromanaged the war, and continually broke promises of aid to Chiang Kai-shek which had devastating moral circumstances. This had led Larabee to imply that Roosevelt had the official story that appears in the white paper of 1949, released in 1950 to the public, as false. The same historiography prior to 1945 appears in the NSC 34 [ 22/series] the same as it appears in the white paper. [19] United States Policy Toward China [Annexes Provide Inventory of U.S. Economic and Military Aid to China Since 1945], Secret, National Security Council Report, October 13, 1948, 33 pp., pp. 12-13. in “U.S., Department of State, coll., Presidential Directives, TD, PD00097, NSC 34, NSA/22 series (Washington DC: Digital National Security Archive, accessed, 23 February 2008), available from http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_dat=xri:dnsa:article:CPD00097; Internet. The NSC 34 report rationalization of ““ all-out aid” amounts to overt intervention. Overt intervention multiplies resistance to the intervener. The ramified forces of new nationalism and traditional Chinese xenophobia would be likely to rally to the communists, who ties with the USSR are obscure in Chinese eyes by the Communists’ violent anti-imperialism. Open U.S. intervention would, as it militarily strengthened Chiang, tend politically to strengthen the Communists. Thus, the more we openly intervened in the deep-rooted Chinese revolution, the more we would become politically involved, the more the National Government would tend to be regulated in Chinese eyes as a puppet—and thus discreditable, the greater our task would become, and the more the intervention would cost.” The United States continually told Chiang that they supported him fully and promised to supply him to win first the Japanese than the Communists. [20] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p. 203. British Field Marshall Sir Archibald Percival Wavell [ British commander in India] received 60,000 tons in March [1943] and Stilwell writes that he was furious. [21] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p. 331. Chiang had the right to control the Lend-Lease, at this time Chiang had wanted Stilwell out as General, and to finally for the first time to control the Lend-Lease. Stilwell used the small amount of Lend-Least for his two personal divisions (Ledo troops, a.k.a. X-force, December 19th 1943 Chiang gives Stilwell full command, in 1944 without permission Stilwell takes them out against the Japanese), to equip them better to prove he was the better Commander, leaving Chiang with little left to accommodate 4,000,000 men. Accusations of militarily aiding the Communists are better for historians to study the entire collection, and understand not only Stilwell, Marshall. John Service, and other U.S. advisors and offices believed arming the Communists would help defeat the Japanese; the KMT they believed could not do it alone. These early sentiments during the war led Truman to later broker a military coalition force between the KMT and the CCP after V-J Day, and eventually changing to a policy of truce between the Nationalist forces and the Communists, before withdrawing military support to the KMT in 1946. [22] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, pp. 316-317. In an undated entry, Stilwell had a moment of honesty. He wrote about the Chinese Army during his final year in China: “In 1944, on paper […names the numbers of troops and divisions]. This looks formable on paper. Then you find. The troops are unpaid, unfed, shot with sickness and malnutrition; equipment is old, inadequate, and unserviceable. Training is nonexistent [Stilwell took it all on himself, he was the only one]; the [U.S.] officers are jobholders; That there is no artillery, transport, medical service, etc., etc.; That conscription is so-and-so; That the business is the principle occupation. How else to live?; How would you start to make such an army effective? [23] Ibid., Commander in Chief, p. 520. [24] Ibid., Commander in Chief, p. 569. [25] Furuya, Keiji, Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, abridged English ed. Chun-ming Chang ( New York: St. John’s University, 1981), p. 827. Chiang’s diary entry for May 24th, 1945: “I was anxious to know if whether the United States has any plans for landings in South Manchuria. Hurley said there are such plans.” [26] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 822. Kai-shek further wrote on March 15th, 1945 in his diary, “It seems beyond any doubt that Russia has agreed to enter the war against Japan. This being so, all the ideals and purposes for which we have been fighting in this war become illusionary.” Wei Tao-ming, China’s Ambassador to the United States had relayed the secret information to Kai-shek. [27] U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 4, June 1951, pp. 2884-2885. Also Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley: A Biography ( Chicago, 1956), p. 368. in Furuya, Keiji, “Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times,” abridged English ed. Chun-ming Chang ( New York: St. John’s University, 1981), p. 823. note 1. [28] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 866. “Under the terms of the Yalta agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, the Soviet Union pledged itself to respect China’s full sovereignty in “Manchuria” and support Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of China,” p. 866. “The Yalta Agreement was kept secret from James Byrnes, who was present at the Conference as Roosevelt’s top advisor, and Harry Truman did not know about anything about it until he entered the White House. It was not mentioned in the Report February 12th, 1945.The President did not refer to it in his speech before a joint session of the Congress on March 1st, when he said the Conference at Yalta ‘concerned itself only with the European War and the political problem of Europe – and not with the Pacific War,’” p. 822. [29] Ibid., Commander in Chief, Patrick J. Hurley was a major player and as a string of U.S. advisors in conflict with Roosevelt who ended up siding with Chiang. Stilwell’s journal entries confirm Larrabee’s views of the President’s micromanagement problems and meddling in Stilwell’s plans take over the Chinese military. Stilwell a proper military commander, always acted in respect to the president, but he was not especially fond of him for meddling in the affairs from afar. History: “Major General Patrick J. Hurley, the Oklahoma politician, secretary of war under Herbert Hoover, who was in Chungking as Roosevelt’s personal representative, believed that he had made praiseworthy progress in getting Chiang to accept a letter of appointment for Stilwell that Hurley had drafted,” p. 573., Also, “the President’s treatment of General Stilwell remains the darkest blot on his record as Commander in Chief. It was all so unnecessary! His other theater commanders he left largely alone, but with Stilwell he continually meddled, undermining Stilwell’s efforts and compromising his authority by sending a stream of “presidential representatives”— Lauchlin Currie, Wendell Wilikie, Henry Wallace, Patrick Hurley, Donald Nelson—whose chief qualifications were their ignorance of China or, in some cases, Roosevelt’s desire to get them out of the country,” p. 578. [30] Ibid., The Global Cold War, p. 112. [31] Ibid., United States Policy Toward China, p. 8. “The Communists have been wining because they are an organized revolutionary force […] they are nearly self sufficient[ …] are efficient, […] won popular support in their territories[…] their “disciplines are high.” [32] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, pp. 321-322. In an undated entry, possibly July, 1944, Stilwell writes his own version for the “Solution in China.” While always a respectful soldier, he voiced his views often. His sentiments were known by all, including Chiang. Chiang believed the communists were smart and double-dealers. Stilwell wrote: “The Cure for China’s troubles is the elimination of Chiang K’ai-shek. The only thing that keeps this country split is his fear of losing control. He hates the Reds and will not take any chances on giving them a toehold in the government. The result is that each side watches the other and neither gives a damn about the war [ against Japan]. If this condition persists, China will have civil war immediately after Japan is out. If Russia enters the war before the united front is formed in China, the Reds, being immediately accessible, will naturally gravitate to Russia’s influence and control. The condition will directly affect the relations between Russia and China, and therefore, indirectly those between Russia and U.S. If we do not take action, our prestige in China will suffer seriously. China will contribute nothing to our effort against Japan, and the seeds will be planted for chaos in China after the war.” [33] Ibid., Commander in Chief, p. 517. Introduction of the The Stilwell Papers (1948), Winifred A. [Stilwell’s wife] organizes his journals to clear her husband’s name from unannounced accusations against him. She contests the accusations swirling around her husband’s time in the KMT that only a true democracy can be run “upon the basis of true information ,” pp. ix-xi. When Stilwell was relieved in October 1948, Roosevelt placed guards around him, and until it was clear he could never mention his time in China. Apparently, he never told his wife which led to her curiosity and subsequent motive. Stilwell consistently paints Chiang Kai-shek as the eastern Hitler and the KMT as the S.S., and Stalin and the Chinese communists as honest and correct. Some can be considered as hyperbole, but most is heartfelt. There is no indication that Stilwell was ever anti-American. He simply never liked Roosevelt because he was a politician, and took issue with Chiang Kai-shek’s adherence to Chinese traditions and republican true motives to unify China. He apparently longed his whole life for stardom, and the events of September 19, 1944 confirmed it in his journal entries. Stilwell wanted to simply lead the great Chinese army (including the Communists) against his hated japs, for glory. Stilwell took issue in personality that he had never been viewed in his career as the top-man. China represented that last chance, and Kai-shek, Roosevelt, and the Chinese tradition(s) stood in his way. [34] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p. 316. [35] These sentiments came out in Stilwell’s journal during the 1944 campaign. See The Stilwell Papers pp. 269-349. Stilwell sought to prove to the world (actually by deception with two special forces [X-force], he had trained and superiorly equipped) that he could force (in reality these under armed, under trained, starving and demoralized main troops) Chinese divisions to fight the superior Japanese. His campaign without approval set off a chain of events -- initially seen as successful by Washington -- had resulted in what Chiang and others feared as a massive counter attack by the Japanese forces that culminated in the September-October 1944 Roosevelt-KMT events that led to Stilwell’s removal. [36] Ibid., The Stilwell Papers, p. 317. Another example, among many in his journal, his frustrations come out against his partner, “Chiang K’ai-shek is a head of a one-party government support supported by the Gestapo and a party secret service. He is now organizing an S. S. of 100,000 members. He hates the Communists. He intends to crush them by keeping any munitions furnished him and by occupying their territory as the Japs retire,” undated entry, p. 340. [37] Ibid., The Global Cold War, p. 112. [38] Mao Zedong ji, MZJ, vol. IX, pp. 183-275, in Yick, Joseph K.S., “Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949” (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 24. Mao Tse-tung’s comments “On Coalition Government” (April 1945), part of the response to the Marshall Mission suggestion for a coalition government, as quoted, “Postwar Chinese government should not be dominated by “landlords, feudal elements, fascists, or bourgeois democrats [capitalists].” [39] Cited in Beijing Daxue Lishixi “Beijing daxue xuesheng yundongshi” Bianxiezu, Beijing daxue xuesheng yundonshhi, p. 197. in Yick, Joseph K.S., “Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949” (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 22, note 11. Also; “According to a left-wing newspaper in Chongqing, more than a thousand Chinese were killed in accidents involving American jeeps from August 1945 to July 1946.” [40] Henry I. Shaw, Jr., The U.S. Marines in North China, pp. 17-18; ZMZS [Zhongguo Goumindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Dangshi Weiyuanhui, Zonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian ( trans. English in quotes)], 7: 3, pp. 201—6; Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp, 489-90. in Yick, Joseph K.S., “Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949” (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 22, note 16. “The most serious incident was the Communist ambush of Marines at Anping, a village between Tianjin and Beiping, on 29 July 1946. Three Marines were killed, one died later of wounds, and a dozen others were injured.” [41] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 899. Chiang was more often than naught, maligned in the Western Press. “It cannot be denied that in psychological warfare the Government was woefully ill-prepared to meet the Communist challenge.” [42] Yick, Joseph K.S., Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 109. [43] The Communists on 5 and 7 June ordered the Americans to end immediately their support of the GMD [ KMT] in the Chinese Civil War and in “the massacre of people in the Northeast.” See the articles “The United States Should Immediately End Its Support of the Chinese Civil War” and “Oppose the American Support in the Massacre of People in the Northeast” in Jeifang ribao [communist supported newspaper], note 14. in Yick, Joseph K.S., Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949 (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 22. [44] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 899. [45] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 885. [46] United states Relations with China, op. cit, p. 694, in Furuya, Keiji, “Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times,” abridged English ed. Chun-ming Chang ( New York: St. John’s University, 1981), p. 887, note 11. “China is a sovereign nation. We recognize the fact the National Government of China. We continue to hope that the Government will find peaceful solution. We are pledged not to interfere in international affairs of China…,” President Harry Truman issued the statement to Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, who read the statement in China at the opening of the National Assembly in January of 1947. On January 6th, 1947, Marshall was recalled from China. [47] Suzanne Pepper. Civil War in China, p. 53, note 8, in Yick, Joseph K.S., “Making Urban Revolution in China: The CCP-GMD Struggle For Beijing-Tianjin, 1945-1949” (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharp, Inc., 1995), p. 21. [48] Ibid., United States Policy Toward China, p. 8. [49] Ibid., Chiang Kai-shek, His Life and Times, p. 895. The NSC 34 estimates 35% of the entire Chinese population was under 24% of communist territory, and only 1 million communist party members. See United States Policy Toward China, NSC 34, p. 5. This was the first democratic election in Chinese history. Communist boycotted the new Constitution. Chiang along with his followers went to Taiwan in later 1949, he bringing the Constitution with him. He decided in Taiwan for reasons including U.S. security agreements and U.S. military bases on the island to place an amendment in the Constitution making it a one-party state (c. 1951). [50] This paper had no space to deal with the complex issue of Soviet military backing of the CCP and its rise to power. I had tried to focuses solely on the U.S.’s role, due to limited space. [51] Ibid., The Global Cold War, p. 112. “On the other hand he [Truman] detested the inefficiency, corruption, and brutality that he saw in Jiang’s Guomintang regime.” [52] Ibid., The Global Cold War. [53] The Congressional Hearing on China had revealed that Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT had been in ideological alignment with the concepts of liberty and that the Communists were anti-American who saw the U.S. as imperialists, based on the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. From then on, the ideological plan in U.S. covert interventions was to, at least in concept, to align with any group that was pro-American – even if these were dictators. The rational was the U.S. was based upon a concept of liberty and its backbone was business and trade. Part of that concept as public (not private government covert operations), as Westad explains, is that freedom and liberty were seen as good and the U.S.A. would always accept friends that shared the same ideology. The Marxist-Leninist doctrine in China (1949 - 1970s)( argued over, some see it as totalitarian or authoritarian with an elite ruling body – or some form of Marxism) identified the U.S. as the imperialists and they should not be dealt with as strategic or market partners. However, I argue is lieu of evidence that Truman’s actions in 1950s with the Navel 7th Fleet doomed any diplomatic opportunities between the U.S. and Mainland China. [54] Ibid., The Global Cold War, p. 118. After 1951, the KMT who had already fled to Taiwan in 1949 was recognized by the U.S. government as the legitimate government of China. It was a dictatorship, but it was pro-western – capitalist. The U.S. government’s views of Chiang, KMT leadership, and their supports who followed them to Taiwan, simply had changed or at least tolerated by some.

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